Mathematical Models of Trading by Singh, Angad
Mathematical Models of Trading
Thesis by
Angad Singh
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Pasadena, California
2020
Defended September 17, 2020
ii
© 2020
Angad Singh
ORCID: 0000-0001-6677-7013
All rights reserved
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost I would like to thank my advisor Jakša Cvitanić for all the support
he has provided over the years. His advice and guidance were instrumental in helping
me navigate between the worlds of mathematics, economics and finance. I would
also like to give a very special thanks to Lawrence Jin for all the interest he took in
me. I benefitted enormously from all our discussions.
Thank you to my other committee members Nets Katz and Omer Tamuz for being
interested in my research. Thank you to the math department for allowing me the
flexibility to pursue my interdisciplinary research interests. And thank you to the
entire Caltech community for providing me with such a wonderful and intellectually
stimulating environment to grow in. I will forever treasure my time spent here.
Last but not least, I would like to thank all my friends and family who have been there
for me throughout the years. The most enormous of thanks go to my mother Simran
Kalra, who has supported me unconditionally in all aspects of my life. Nothing
would have been possible without her love and care. This thesis is dedicated to her.
iv
ABSTRACT
This thesis presents a mathematical framework to model trading of financial assets on
an exchange. The interaction between agents on the exchange is modeled as the Nash
equilibrium of a demand schedule auction. The submission of demand schedules in
the auction is meant to proxy for the submission of limit and market orders on an
exchange. Chapter 1 considers this auction in a one-period setting, highlighting the
importance of noisy flow for obtaining a unique Nash equilibrium.
Chapter 2 is the core of the thesis and considers the auction in a continuous time
setting. Here the agents trading on the exchange have quadratic-type preferences,
and in equilibrium they must clear an exogenously specified stream of market orders.
Chapter 3 considers alternative and more realistic dynamics for the exogenous market
orders. Chapter 4 endogenizes the market orders by considering an agent executing
orders on behalf of noisy clients.. Chapter 5 considers the same model as in Chapter
2, except with a consumption based utility function for each agent.
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1RELATED LITERATURE
The contents of this thesis relate to three strands of existing academic literature. The
first is the theoretical economics literature on market microstructure. The second is
the mathematical finance literature on optimal execution. The third is the finance
literature on asset pricing.
The literature on market microstructure is fairly classical and considers various
one-period equilibrium auction models. Thorough reviews are given in [OHa11]
and [FPR13]. The demand schedule auction used in this thesis was first introduced
in [Wil79]. [Kyl89] uses the demand schedule auction to study price impact as a
consequence of adverse selection. The contents of Chapter 1 are similar to these
papers, though the specific theorems proven are new. One major way in which
Chapter 1 (and the rest of the thesis) deviates from [Kyl89] is that price impact is not
a consequence of adverse selection. Instead, price impact compensates agents on
the exchange for absorbing short term imbalances. This is in line with the idea of
liquidity as the price of immediacy, as introduced in [GM88].
The literature on optimal execution considers dynamic partial equilibrium problems
for an individual agent trading against a price impact function. This literature was
pioneered in [AC01] and has since been extended in a variety of directions, as
reviewed in [CJP15] and [Gué16]. The optimal response problems for the models in
Chapters 2-5 are very much analogous to the optimization problems in this literature.
However, this literature always takes the market price impact function as exogenously
given, whereas in this thesis the price impact function is endogenous.
Asset pricing is the standard framework used in the academic finance community to
model market prices. Thorough introductions to the subject are given in [Coc05]
and [Bac17]. This literature does not explicitly model auctions, as the market
microstructure literature does, but instead uses a general equilibrium approach.
Furthermore, trading costs are usually ignored in these models. [GP16] and
[Bou+18] do consider trading costs in asset pricing settings, but these costs are
2exogenously specified. Also, the trading costs in these models are not in the form of
market price impact, but instead are transaction costs paid on top of market prices.
Many of the modeling techniques in this thesis are inspired by these papers, and also
by the continuous time CARA-Normal frameworks used in [CK93] and [Bar+15]
This thesis presents a dynamic auction based equilibrium framework to model asset
prices. In particular, the endogenous level of prices consists of a price impact
component that reflects the quantity being cleared on the exchange. When solving
their individual optimization problems, all agents take in to account the market
impact of their trades. This allows for a rich asset pricing model with microstructure
details and with optimal execution problems for individuals. As such it bridges
together the three strands of literature above.
Only two other papers in the literature consider dynamic models similar to the ones
in this thesis, and both have a markedly different focus. The first is [SS16], which
focuses on heterogenous agents and front running. One section of the paper considers
a model of price impact between a large trader and a competitive fringe, which is
similar to the model in Chapter 4. However, the model in Chapter 4 features multiple
large traders (market makers) and considers an explicit optimization problem for the
fringe (liquidity traders trading on behalf of clients). The second paper is [KOW18],
which is focused on using private information and overconfidence to get around the
classic no-trade theorem in finance.
3C h a p t e r 1
ONE PERIOD MODELS
This chapter formulates and discusses some one period models of auctions for shares1.
The type of auction considered is typically referred to as a conditional uniform price
auction, or as the demand schedule game. At the beginning of the auction, each agent
submits a demand schedule D : R→ R, which is a commitment to purchase D(p)
shares if the price per share is p. The auctioneer then observes all the schedules,
aggregates them into a total demand schedule, and chooses a price such that the
auction clears. Agents receive shares based on their individual demand schedules,
and finally they derive utility from the payoff associated to each share.
This type of auction is interesting because it’s a good way to model agents trading
through a limit order book. At a very high level, the decision to place market and
limit orders amounts to deciding how aggressively to trade. A trader with a great
sense of urgency might submit a large market order, which executes immediately,
but is subject to walking the book. On the other hand, a more patient trader might
scatter a few limit orders throughout the book, which may or may not execute, but
will do so at a good price if they do. Finally, note then when an order executes it
must, by definition, execute against another order placed by another agent. Thus
agents are not just deciding how aggressively to push their own trading agendas, but
also how aggressively to absorb the order flow of other traders.
Returning to the auction, note that selecting a demand schedule also amounts to
deciding how aggressively to trade. A vertical demand schedule is equivalent to
submitting a market order, as it demands a fixed quantity regardless of the price
received. Tilting the slope of the demand schedule downwards is much like placing
limit orders. It gives the agent the opportunity to trade at a good price, but this is not
a guarantee because there must be another agent willing to accept the other side of
1For our purposes a share is simply a unit of an infinitely divisible good.
4this trade. Finally, from a game theoretic point of view, when an agent takes others’
schedules as given he is a monopsonist facing a supply curve. The suppliers are
of course the other agents in the game, so forming an optimal response involves
pushing ones own trading agenda while also deciding how much of others’ order
flow to absorb.
Hence the decision-making process of an agent in the demand schedule game captures
many features of trading on a limit order book. An interesting property of the demand
schedule game is that it features multiple equilibria when there is no uncertainty in
the quantity to be cleared at the auction. From our point of view this is a realistic
feature, as the quantity to be cleared on the exchange at any instant is uncertain. This
first section below formulates and discusses this result. The second section presents
a version of the model where agents have initial inventories, thereby formulating it
as a Bayesian game. This version of the model connects better with the dynamic
models to follow.
1.1 The Auction Model
There are N ≥ 2 agents bidding for a total of S outstanding shares. Each share will,
after the auction, provide a random payoff of µ˜ ∼ N(µ, σ2). Agents are assumed
to have CARA preferences over payoffs, with risk aversion parameter γ > 0. Thus
if an agent purchase q shares in the auction for a price of p per share, his expected
utility is E[−e−γq(µ˜−p)]. We will assume that agents can only submit affine and
decreasing demand schedules2. So a demand schedule is characterized by a pair
(a, b) ∈ R × (0,∞), corresponding to the commitment to purchase a − bp shares
when the price per share is p.3
In addition to the N agents there are noise traders who have a random perfectly
2The affine assumption is not strictly necessary, as an optimal response to a profile of affine
schedules is also given by an affine schedule.
3b = ∞ corresponds to placing an order that specifies a price but no quantity. Such an order is
not possible on an exchange, and thus is not allowed here. Technically we should allow b = 0, since it
corresponds to placing a market order. However, we only consider symmetric equilibria below, and
b = 0 can trivially never be such an equilibrium. Thus for the sake of exposition b = 0 is omitted
from the outset.
5inelastic demand for −u˜ shares. Thus the total number of shares the N agents must
clear in the auction is S + u˜. By adjusting the mean of u˜ we can simply assume that
the total number of shares being auctioned is random and equal to u˜. We assume
that u˜ is independent of µ˜, but make no other assumptions about its distribution.
Given demand schedules (a1, b1), · · · , (aN, bN ), the auction price p and the shares
q1, · · · , qN bought by each agent are implicitly given by
an − bnp = qn (1.1)
q1 + · · · + qN = u˜. (1.2)
This describes a game in normal form, and we now proceed to study its Nash
equilibria. We will focus only on symmetric equilibria, that is on equilibria where all
agents submit the same demand schedule. Note that in a symmetric equilibrium all
agents purchase the same number of shares in the auction, i.e. q1 = · · · = qN = u˜N .
Theorem 1.1.1. Fix exogenous parameters N ≥ 2, γ, σ > 0 and µ ∈ R.
If u˜ is degenerate, i.e. u˜ = u ∈ R a.s., then there is a one-to-one correspondence
between symmetric equilibria and λ > 0. In equilibrium the price is
p = µ − γσ
2
N
u − λ
N
u. (1.3)
If u˜ is non-degenerate and N ≥ 3, then there is a unique symmetric equilibrium with
price
p = µ − γσ
2
N
u˜ − γσ
2
N(N − 2) u˜. (1.4)
If u˜ is non-degenerate and N = 2 then a symmetric equilibrium does not exist.
Proof. Fix a strategy (a, b) ∈ R × (0,∞) to be played by all but one agent, and
consider the optimal response problem faced by the remaining agent. If this agent
plays strategy (α, β) ∈ R × (0,∞), then his expected utility will be E[−e−γq(µ˜−p)]
with p and q given implicitly by
q = α − βp (1.5)
u˜ − q
N − 1 = a − bp. (1.6)
6Rearranging we obtain
p = F − λu˜ + λq (1.7)
q =
[
α
1 + λβ
− β
1 + λβ
F
]
+
λβ
1 + λβ
u˜, (1.8)
where F := ab and λ :=
1
b(N−1) .
We note a few things about these equations. Firstly, the parameters F and λ
characterize the symmetric profile given by (a, b) and are independent of the
remaining agent’s demand schedule. Secondly, equation (7) tells us that the price the
remaining agent receives is uniquely determined by the number of shares he receives.
Thus the agent is indifferent between schedules that lead to the same quantity of
shares. Thirdly, from equation (8) we see that choosing (α, β) ∈ R × (0,∞) amounts
to choosing to receive the quantity q ∈ V where
V := {A + Bu˜ : (A, B) ∈ R × (0, 1)}. (1.9)
Fourthly, if the agent submits the schedule (a, b) then he receives the quantity q = u˜N .
All this goes to show that in forming an optimal response, the remaining agent can
maximize directly over q ∈ V , with the price given by (7), and in equilibrium the
maximum must be attained at u˜N . Thus symmetric equilibria correspond to F ∈ R
and λ > 0 such that
u˜
N
∈ argmax
q∈V
E
[
− e−γq
(
µ˜−F+λu˜−λq
) ]
, (1.10)
and in equilibrium the price is
p = F − N − 1
N
λu˜. (1.11)
Now, note that u˜ is independent of µ˜ and every q ∈ V is u˜ measurable. Since the
MGF of µ˜ is E[et µ˜] = eµt+σ22 t2 , we can compute the expectation in (10) for any q ∈ V
as
E
[
− e−γq
(
µ−F+λu˜−(λ+γσ22 )q
) ]
. (1.12)
7For any F ∈ R and λ > 0, the function of q in (12) is strictly concave over the convex
set V . Thus the argmax in (10) consists of at most one point. Furthermore, for any
F ∈ R, λ > 0 and u ∈ R, the much relaxed problem of maximizing the exponent in
(12)
max
q∈R
q(µ − F + λu −
(
λ +
γσ2
2
)
q)
has unique solution qˆ = µ−F2λ+γσ2 +
λ
2λ+γσ2u.
It follows that (10) holds if and only if
u˜
N
=
µ − F
2λ + γσ2
+
λ
2λ + γσ2
u˜. (1.13)
Thus symmetric equilibria correspond to F ∈ R and λ > 0 satisfying (13), and in
equilibrium the price is given by (11).
Now, if u˜ is degenerate and equal to u ∈ R a.s., then (13) simply reads
F = µ − γσ
2
N
u +
N − 2
N
λu. (1.14)
Thus there a one-to-one correspondence between symmetric equilibria and λ > 0,
with F given by (14). The first statement in the theorem follows by using (14) to
substitute for F in (11).
Next suppose that u˜ is non-degenerate. Then (14) holds if and only if F = µ and
λ > 0 satisfies
(N − 2)λ = γσ2. (1.15)
If N = 2 then no λ > 0 can satisfy (15), so a symmetric equilibrium does not
exist, proving the last statement in the theorem. If N ≥ 3 then the unique λ > 0
satisfying (15) is λ = γσ
2
N−2 , and so there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. The
second statement in the theorem now follows by plugging in F = µ and λ = γσ
2
N−2 in
(11). 
Discussion
The idea in the proof is to characterize symmetric profiles in terms of the parameters
F and λ of the induced the optimal response problem. The optimal response problem
8is to choose an expected utility maximizing quantity on the linear supply curve (7),
which has intercept F −λu˜ and slope λ > 0. This is a concave maximization problem
with a unique solution. The symmetric equilibrium condition on F and λ is that this
solution is u˜N . In the non-degenerate case this condition uniquely determines F and
λ whereas in the degenerate case it only specifies F as a function of λ.
What happens in the degenerate case is that the agents are able to form an agreement
to misprice the asset and then take equal shares of the profit. Consider for example
the case when u˜ = 1, so a unit share is being cleared at the auction. Then (3) states
that the equilibrium price can take on any value below µ − γσ2N , which is the price
the asset would trade at in a competitive equilibrium. Thus we see that the asset is
being priced relatively low, and since each agent takes 1N shares, they split the profits
equally.
Since the game is non-cooperative, in order to form an agreement the agents must
have a way to prevent others from taking more than an equal share of the profits. The
key point is that all agents submit entire demand schedules, which specify what the
price must be contingent on the quantity the agent receives. So if one agent were to
take more than 1N shares, some other agents would receive less than
1
N shares, and
this would cause the price to move, thus dissuading any one agent from trying to
take extra shares in the first place.
The amount by which the price would move if an agent took more then 1N shares is
governed by the parameter λ, which corresponds to the quantity elasticity b of the
equilibrium demand schedule. The lower the equilibrium price p, the more of an
incentive an agent has to acquire more than 1N shares, and thus the higher λ needs to
be to prevent the agent from doing so. (3) says exactly that low equilibrium prices
correspond to high values of λ.
The problem in the degenerate case is that agents suffer no cost from being quantity
elastic, since there will be no surprise trades in equilibrium. Hence λ can take on any
positive value in equilibrium. In the non-degenerate case, agents suffer costs from
being quantity elastic in equilibrium, because there is uncertainty in the quantity to
9be cleared. These costs manifest in how the parameter λ effects the uncertainty of
equilibrium prices. Since agents care about the uncertainty of prices, this pins down
the unique equilibrium value of λ as γσ
2
N−2 .
The coefficient of u˜ in (4) is N−1N(N−2)γσ
2, which is the price impact of the noise traders’
order. If the noise traders sell  more shares, so the realization of u˜ is  higher, then
the equilibrium price is N−1N(N−2)γσ
2 lower. Thus orders walk the book: the larger an
order, the lower the transaction price.
The decomposition of price impact into the two terms is motivated by considering the
competitive limit as N →∞ and γN is held fixed. In the limit the second term vanishes
and only the first remains. Thus µ − γσ2N u˜ is the competitive benchmark, and the
second term is the deviation due to imperfect competition. As in the competitive case,
the term γσ2 u˜N is the risk compensation each agent requires to take the equilibrium
exposure of u˜N .
The interpretation is that price impact arises for two reasons in the model. Firstly
to make sure agents are appropriately compensated for bearing risk, and secondly
because agents have market power. The first reason persists even in the competitive
limit, and as result price impact does not vanish in the limit. This will be a recurring
theme throughout the thesis.
1.2 The Auction Model with Inventories
The continuous time models considered in the subsequent chapters essentially consist
of the auction above at each instant, with the addition of certain state variables
that need to be carried from instant to instant. The state variables are the existing
inventories of shares that agents have accumulated from trading in the past. This
section introduces these state variables in a static setting as types, thus generalizing
the model above to a Bayesian game.
In addition to forming a tighter connection with the continuous time models to follow,
the rephrased model in this section has two other appealing features. Firstly, in the
10
previous section the total number of outstanding shares plays no distinct role4 from
the noise traders’ order. This is perhaps counterintuitive, as the noise traders’ order
should have price impact, whereas the total number of outstanding shares should be
a fixed component of the price. In this section the total number of outstanding shares
will show up as a fixed component of the price. Secondly, in the previous section
all agents purchased the same number of shares in equilibrium. In this section their
purchases will be heterogenous.
The model is exactly as before except that each of the N agents starts out with an
existing inventory of Xn ∈ R shares. Thus if agent n purchases qn shares in the
auction for a price of p per share, then his expected utility is
E
[
− e−γ
(
(Xn+qn)µ˜−pqn
) ]
. (1.16)
The noise traders start out with zero shares, and the total number of outstanding
shares is S, so
∑N
n=1 X
n = S.
More formally, we work on a probability space with a single objective probability
measure. There are N + 2 real-valued random variables defined on this probability
space: µ˜, u˜, and X1, · · · , XN . There are exogenous constants µ, S ∈ R and σ > 0
such that µ˜ ∼ N(µ, σ2) and ∑Nn=1 Xn = S. Furthermore, µ˜ and u˜ are independent of
each other as well as X1, · · · , XN .
The type (or private information) of agent n is Xn. A strategy is a measurable function
mapping the realization of an agent’s type to a choice of demand schedule. As before
demand schedules are restricted to be affine and strictly decreasing, so a strategy for
agent n is a measurable mapping (an, bn) : R → R × (0,∞), X 7→ (an(X), bn(X)).
Given a strategy profile and a realization of (X1, · · · , XN ), prices and quantities are
determined from (1) and (2) with an = an(Xn) and bn = bn(Xn).
This completes the description of the model as a Bayesian game. Wewill be interested
in identifying Bayesian Nash equilibria5 in this game, but we will focus on equilibria
that have a very specific structure.
4In the previous section, the total number of outstanding shares was absorbed into the mean of u˜.
5What we call a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is sometimes called a strong Bayesian Nash
11
Definition 1.2.1. A strategy s : R → R × (0,∞) is called linear if there exist
constants a, ξ ∈ R and b ∈ (0,∞) such that
s(X) = (aX + ξ, b) ∀X ∈ R.
Our focus will be on linear symmetric equilibria, that is on equilibria where all agents
play the same linear strategy.
Theorem 1.2.2. Fix exogenous parameters N ≥ 3, γ, σ > 0 and µ, S ∈ R.
If u˜ is non-degenerate then there is a unique linear symmetric equilibrium. In
equilibrium, the price is
p = µ − γσ
2
N
S − N − 1
N(N − 2)γσ
2u˜ (1.17)
and the quantities purchased by each agent are
qn = −N − 2
N − 1 (X
n − S
N
) + u˜
N
. (1.18)
Proof. Fix a linear strategy given by a, ξ ∈ R and b ∈ (0,∞) to be played by all but
one agent, and consider the optimal response problem faced by the remaining agent.
Suppose the remaining agent plays the strategy R→ R × (0,∞), x 7→ (α(x), β(x)).
If the agent’s initial inventory is X , then his expected utility is E[−e−γ((X+q)µ˜−pq)],
where p and q are given implicitly by
a
N − 1 (S − X) + ξ − bp =
u˜ − q
N − 1 (1.19)
α(X) − β(X)p = q. (1.20)
Rearranging we obtain
p = F + C(S − X) − λu˜ + λq (1.21)
q =
[
α(X)
1 + λβ(X) −
β(X)
1 + λβ(X)
(
F + C(S − X)
)]
+
λβ(X)
1 + λβ(X) u˜, (1.22)
equilibrium. We require agent n to choose a strategy that maximizes (16) conditional on Xn for
every realization of Xn. This is in contrast to the weaker requirement of choosing a strategy that just
maximizes (16), which averages over realizations of Xn.
12
where F := ξb , C :=
a
b(N−1) and λ :=
1
b(N−1) .
We note a few things about theses equations. Firstly, the parameters F, C and λ
characterize the symmetric profile given by a, ξ and b, and they are independent
of the remaining agent’s demand schedule. Secondly, equation (21) tells us that if
we hold the remaining agent’s initial inventory fixed, then the price the remaining
agent receives is uniquely determined by the quantity he trades. Thus the agent
is indifferent between demand schedules that lead to the same quantity of shares.
Thirdly, from equation (22) we see that choosing a strategy (α, β) amounts to choosing
functions A : R → R and B : R → (0, 1) such that the agent’s traded quantity is
q = A(X) + B(X)u˜. Fourthly, if the agent uses the linear strategy (aX + ξ, b) then
his traded quantity is q = Cλ
(
X − SN
)
+ u˜N .
All this goes to show that linear symmetric equilibria correspond to F,C ∈ R and
λ > 0 such that
C
λ
(
x − S
N
)
+
u˜
N
∈ argmax
q∈V
E
[
− e−γ
(
x µ˜+q
(
µ˜−F−C(S−x)+λu˜−λq
) ) ]
∀x ∈ R, (1.23)
where V is as in (9). In equilibrium the price is
p = F +
N − 1
N
CS − N − 1
N
λu˜, (1.24)
and agents’ trades are
qn =
C
λ
(
Xn − S
N
)
+
u˜
N
. (1.25)
Now, note that u˜ is independent of µ˜ and every q ∈ V is u˜ measurable. Since the
MGF of µ˜ is E[et µ˜] = eµt+σ22 t2 , we can compute the expectation in (23) for any q ∈ V
and x ∈ R as
e−γµxE
[
− e−γ
(
q
(
µ−F−C(S−x)+λu˜−λq
)
−γσ22 (x+q)2
) ]
. (1.26)
For any F,C, x ∈ R and λ > 0, the function of q in (26) is strictly concave over the
convex set V . Thus the argmax in (23) consists of at most one point. Furthermore,
for any F,C, x ∈ R, λ > 0 and u ∈ R, the much relaxed problem of maximizing the
13
exponent inside the expectation in (26)
max
q∈R
q
(
µ − F − C(S − x) + λu˜ − λq) − γσ2
2
(x + q)2
has unique solution qˆ = µ−F−CS2λ+γσ2 +
C−γσ2
2λ+γσ2 x +
λ
2λ+γσ2u.
It follows that (23) holds if and only if
C
λ
(
x − S
N
)
+
u˜
N
=
µ − F − CS
2λ + γσ2
+
C − γσ2
2λ + γσ2
x +
λ
2λ + γσ2
u˜ ∀x ∈ R. (1.27)
Since u˜ is non-degenerate, (27) holds if and only if F = µ,C = − γσ2N−1 , and λ = γσ
2
N−2 .
The theorem now follows by plugging these values is (24) and (25). 
Discussion
The proof is similar to the one in the previous section, with the idea being to
characterize symmetric profiles in terms of the parameters F, C and λ of the induced
optimal response problem. The additional parameter C governs how the intercept of
the supply curve in the optimal response problem depends on the optimizing agent’s
initial inventory. More specifically, C captures the dependence of the intercept on
the sum of all other agents’ inventories, which the optimizing agent can compute
by subtracting his own inventory from the total number of outstanding shares, i.e.
S − X .
The supply curve represents the prices at which the other agents are willing to clear
the joint order of the noise traders and the optimizing agent. These prices must
depend on the preexisting exposures of the remaining agents, hence the presence of
the parameter C. For symmetric profiles, the others’ exposure can be aggregated
instead of considering individual exposures, which greatly simplifies the problem.
The constant term in the equilibrium price is µ − γσ2N S, as opposed to just µ in
the previous theorem. Thus there is a constant discount in the price reflecting the
total number of outstanding shares. Intuitively this discount appears here because
the agents are already in possession of S shares prior to the auction, whereas in
the previous section they initially posses no shares. The coefficient of u˜ in the
equilibrium price is N−1N(N−2)γσ
2, exactly as in the previous section.
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A unified way to write the equilibrium price in the two theorems is in terms of
the aggregate inventory of the agents after the auction, denoted Spost . In the first
section’s model we have Spost = u˜ and in the second section we have Spost = S + u˜.
In both sections, the equilibrium price is
p = µ − γσ
2
N
Spost − γσ
2
N(N − 2) u˜. (1.28)
The first two terms here are the competitive benchmark, and the last term is the
deviation due to imperfect competition.
At first glance it might seem surprising and counterintuitive that the deviation due
to imperfect competition depends on u˜ and not Spost . For example, if Spost > 0 and
u˜ < 0, then the agents are in aggregate long the asset, but the price is high relative
to the competitive benchmark. The deviation due to imperfect competition should
always favor the agents, so one might expect it to make the price low when they are
going long and high when they are going short. However this reasoning is flawed
because the price in (28) is not the price at which the agents enter their aggregate
position of Spost . It is merely the price at which the agents shift their aggregate
position from S to Spost . Said another way, (28) is not the denominator in the agents’
aggregate return, and as such the low/high long/short reasoning does not apply.
The logic behind (28) is that the price is low when the noise traders are selling, u˜ > 0,
and high when they are buying, u˜ < 0. Thus, roughly speaking, the noise traders are
always "getting ripped off." This can be made more precise by recalling the analogy
between the auction and a limit order book. Based on this analogy, the price in (17)
can be interpreted as saying that the mid-price is µ− γσ2N S, and orders walk the book
at a rate of γσ
2
N(N−2) per share.
Now, suppose the auction is repeated an instant later (prior to the realization of
payoffs). Since the aggregate inventory of the agents will be Spost an instant later,
the mid-price will be µ − γσ2N Spost . So, (28) says that if the agents buy in the first
auction, u˜ > 0, then they do so at a price lower than the mid-price in the second
auction. Similarly if they sell in the first auction, u˜ < 0, then they do so at a price
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higher than the mid-price in the second auction. Thus agents always trade in the first
auction at prices that are favorable relative to the mid-price in the second auction. In
particular, if an agent were to unwind the position acquired in the first auction with
a limit order6 in the second auction, then the roundtrip trade would earn positive
profits. This is the sense in which the deviation due to imperfect competition always
favors the agents. This logic will reappear more clearly in future chapters, where we
look at dynamic models and the auction truly is repeated instant after instant.
From (18) we see that the agents trade heterogenous quantities of shares in the
auction, unlike in the previous section where they all traded u˜N . Since the agents
must clear u˜ in the auction, it follow that the average number of shares bought by
each agent is u˜N , but some agents might buy more and some less. The total initial
inventory of the agents is S, so the average inventory held by each agent is SN . (18)
says that the agents with above average inventories buy less, and those with below
average inventories buy more.
A more precise way to understand the traded quantities is in terms of the Pareto
optimality of the inventory distribution before and after the auction. Since all
agents are identical, it would be Pareto optimal for them to hold SN shares before
the auction and SpostN after the auction. Individual inventories after the auction are
Xnpost := Xn + qn and from (18) it follows that
Xnpost −
Spost
N
=
1
N − 1 (X
n − S
N
). (1.29)
Thus (29) says that trading in the auction moves inventories closer to efficiency by a
factor of 1N−1 . When N takes its smallest value of 3, the agents only move halfway
towards efficiency, whereas they move entirely towards efficiency in the limit as
6Technically a market order could also work in the second auction if it does not suffer too much
price impact. The point is to unwind the position in the second auction at a favorable price relative
to (28). Since the mid-price in the second auction will be µ − γσ2N Spost , the price will always be
favorable if using a limit order, and for a market order it depends on the price impact. In the dynamic
model, equilibrium price impact will be constant over time and using market orders will not work
for the agents. However noise trader flow will mean revert, so the agents will eventually be able to
unwind their positions using limit orders, and this will earn positive profits.
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N → ∞. Thus imperfect competition among the agents results in imperfect risk
sharing.
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C h a p t e r 2
CONTINUOUS TIME MODEL
This chapter presents a continuous time model of trading on an exchange. The model
is set on an infinite horizon, and each instant in time consists of the auction from
chapter one. Traders hold cash and shares, and these fluctuate over time based on the
outcomes of the auctions. As in Chapter 1 there are two types of traders: market
makers, endogenous, and liquidity traders, exogenous.
In this chapter the exogenous dynamics of the liquidity traders orders are taken to be
as simple as possible: an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. This allows us to focus on the
mechanics of solving the model in a relatively simple setting. These liquidity trader
dynamics have some drawbacks, however. In particular, there is no mean reversion
in the liquidity traders’ shareholdings, and thus there is also no clear notion of round
trip trades by the market makers. Chapter 3 considers alternative dynamics to deal
with these issues.
The first section of the chapter formulates the model as a stochastic differential game
and defines the equilibrium concept to be considered. The second section phrases
the optimal response problem for an individual as a standard stochastic control
problem. The third section provides a complete closed-form characterization of
equilibrium by solving this problem. The last section discusses the economics behind
the endogenous price and trading processes that arise in the models equilibrium.
2.1 The Model
Fix a filtered probability space (Ω, F , {Ft}, P) equipped with two independent
Brownian motions, {BDt } and {BNt }, and satisfying the usual conditions. We
consider a market on an infinite horizon where shares of a zero net supply risky asset
are traded for cash. Cash is in infinitely elastic supply, earns no interest, and is the
numeraire. The market is populated by two types of traders: N ∈ N market makers
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and a collection of liquidity traders. Each market maker starts out at time 0 holding
Xn0 shares of the asset, n = 1, · · · , N . The liquidity traders start out with a collective
shareholding of −S0, which must satisfy S0 = X10 + · · ·+ XN0 since the asset is in zero
net supply.
At each instant in time the traders transact with one another at a uniform price pt .
Trading occurs smoothly, meaning that each trader has a trading rate, which is the
time derivative of his current shareholdings.1 Trading rates and the trading price
at each instant in time are determined by a demand schedule auction between the
traders. Thus at time t each trader submits an affine2 demand schedule of the form
q = ut−vtp. This is a commitment to trade at rate ut−vtp at time t if the trading price
is p. We denote this demand schedule by (ut, vt). The process {(ut, vt)} is required
to be progressively measurable, though we will place more stringent conditions on it
below.
The liquidity traders’ collective demand schedule at time t is exogenously give as
(−Nt, 0), where
dNt = −ψNtdt + σNdBNt (2.1)
and ψ, σN > 0. Thus the liquidty traders’ demand schedule is a vertical line through
the point −Nt , which we interpret as a market order to sell Ntdt shares over the time
interval [t, t + dt]. The liquidity traders’ motives to trade are not modeled; it is simply
assumed that they results in the trajectory of market order trading rates {−Nt}.
The market makers, on the other hand, submit demand schedules in order to maximize
certain objectives. Denote the market makers’ trading rates by qnt , so that their
inventories evolve according to
dXnt = q
n
t dt . (2.2)
1Shareholdings will also be referred to as inventories in what follows.
2It is actually not necessary to assume that agents can only submit affine schedules, as we will
see below. For the class of equilibria we consider, when forming an optimal response an agent can
achieve any trading rate via an affine demand schedule. Thus even if agents could submit arbitrary
schedules, there would still be an equilibrium where they all submit affine schedules. Of course, there
may also be other equilibria where agents submit more exotic schedules.
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If the market makers submit the demand schedule processes {(αntβnt ,
1
βnt
)}, then their
trading rates qnt and the trading price pt are determined implicitly by
αnt − βnt qnt = pt ∀n = 1, · · · , N (2.3)
q1t + · · · + qNt = Nt . (2.4)
Note that the price, trading rate, and inventory processes all depend on the choice of
demand schedule processes. This dependence is suppressed in the notation.
Each market maker has cash holding Mnt which evolve as a result of trading according
to dMnt = −qnt ptdt. The market makers are also assumed at time t to have a common
exogenous valuation of the asset as Dt , where
dDt = µdt + σDdBDt (2.5)
and µ, σD > 0 are fixed constants. Thus each marker maker values his book,
consisting of joint holdings in cash and the asset, asWnt = Xnt Dt + Mnt . This is the
market maker’s wealth, computed by valuing shareholdings at Dt .
Each market maker chooses his demand schedule to maximize the objective
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
dWnt −
γ
2
d〈Wn〉t
)]
, (2.6)
where ρ, γ > 0. Here 〈Wn〉t is the quadratic variation of the market makers
wealth, and so d〈Wn〉t can be thought of as the variance of instantaneous wealth
changes. Thus the integrand in (6) can be interpreted as a mean-variance utility flow
from instantaneous returns, which means that (6) embodies myopic3 mean-variance
preferences over returns.
One can compute the objective function in (6) as
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
− qnt (pt − Dt) + µXnt −
γσ2D
2
(Xnt )2
)
dt
]
. (2.7)
Thus the market makers want to buy, qnt > 0, when the price is below their valuation,
pt − Dt < 0, and vice versa. Furthermore, they enjoy holding inventory to the extent
3Myopic because the utility flow comes from instantaneous returns.
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that valuations grow on average, µ > 0, and they are averse to holding inventory to
the extent that valuations are volatile, σ2D > 0.
Barring technicalities, this completes the description of the model as a stochastic
differential game between the N market makers. Indeed, the control process4 of each
market maker is {(αnt , βnt )} and the controlled dynamics are described by (1) - (5).
The coupled objectives of the market makers are given by (7), the coupling being
induced by (3) and (4). The initial conditions for the game are the initial conditions
for equations (1), (2), and (5). We are interested in studying the Nash equilibria of
this game.
What remains is to formally specify the equilibrium concept that we will consider
for this game. This includes any measurability and integrability conditions that the
admissible controls must satisfy, as well as any restrictions on the class of equilibria
that will be studied. This is carried out in the subsection below. The rest of the
chapter is dedicated to characterizing and analyzing the model’s equilibrium.
Equilibrium Concept
We begin by specifying the admissibility conditions that the market makers’ demand
schedules must satisfy. Firstly, we need to make sure that the system (3) - (4)
can be solved uniquely to define progressively measurable trading rates and prices.
Secondly, prices and trading rates must be sufficiently well-behaved so that the
(implicit) integrals in (2) and the double integral in (7) converge absolutely. Finally,
we will want to place some measurability restrictions on the demand schedule
processes in order to reflect the type of information that market makers have access
to. This gives rise to the definition of admissible profiles of demand schedules.
Definition 2.1.1. Given initial conditions (®x, η, d) ∈ RN×R×R for (X10 , · · · , XN0 ), N0,
and D0, we say that the profile of progressively measurable demand schedules
{(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )} is admissible starting from (®x, η, d) if:
4We take as controls the parameters of the inverse demand as opposed to the demand. This
simplifies much of the algebra below. We will continue to refer to the controls as demand schedules.
21
1. βnt > 0 ∀t ≥ 0, ∀n = 1, · · · , N almost surely
2.
∫ T
0 |qnt |dt < ∞ ∀T ≥ 0, ∀n = 1, · · · , N almost surely
3. The double integral (7) converges absolutely
4. αnt , βnt ∈ σ
(
{Ds}0≤s≤t, {ps}0≤s<t, {Xns }0≤s≤t, S0
)
∀t ≥ 0, ∀n = 1, · · · N .
The first condition says that market makers may only submit strictly decreasing
demand schedules, and it guarantees that the system (3) - (4) can be solved uniquely
to define progressively measurable trading rates and prices. The second and third
conditions ensure that the integrals in (2) and (7) converge. The fourth condition
states that the information a market maker has access to at any moment in time
consists of the history of valuations, the history of prices, the history of his own
shareholdings, and the initial level of the liquidity traders’ shareholdings. This is
essentially the information that exchanges provide to traders in reality.
We are interested in identifying admissible profiles of demand schedules that are Nash
equilibria. Given a profile of demand schedules {(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )} that’s
admissible starting from (®x, η, d), denote by Jn (®x, η, d, {(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )})
the value of the double integral (7). This is the payoff that market maker n receives
when everyone’s strategies are {(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )} and the initial conditions
are (X10 , · · · , XN0 ) = ®x, N0 = η, and D0 = d.
Definition 2.1.2. Given initial conditions (®x, η, d), we say that a profile of demand
schedules {(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )} is aNash Equilibrium starting from (®x, η, d)
if:
1. The profile is admissible starting from (®x, η, d)
2. For any n = 1, · · · , N , and for any demand schedule process {(αt, βt)} such
that
{(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αn−1t , βn−1t )}, {(αt, βt)}, {(αn+1t , βn+1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )}
)
is ad-
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missible starting from (®x, η, d), we have that
Jn
(®x, η, d, {(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )}) ≥
Jn
(®x, η, d, {(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αn−1t , βn−1t )}, {(αt, βt)}, {(αn+1t , βn+1t )},
· · · , {(αNt , βNt )}
)
.
The second condition is the standard condition for a Nash equilibrium. It states
that when all the market makers but market maker n play their equilibrium demand
schedules, the maximum payoff the nth market maker can earn is if he also plays
his equilibrium demand schedule. In other words, when considering the optimal
response problem against a profile of equilibrium demand schedules, each market
maker finds it optimal to also use his equilibrium demand schedule.
Unfortunately, identifying all the Nash equilibria in this model is intractable and
beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead we will focus on a special class of equilibria
where all the market makers’ demand schedules have a linear and symmetric structure.
While this is fairly restrictive, the equilibria seem quite realistic and exhibit interesting
dynamics.
Denote by −St the collective share holdings of the liquidity traders at time t. Since
the asset is in zero net supply, St must satisfy
St = X1t + · · ·+ XNt = X10 +
∫ t
0
q1s ds + · · ·+ XN0 +
∫ t
0
qNs ds = S0 +
∫ t
0
Nsds (2.8)
∀t ≥ 0. We will only consider equilibria where all market makers use demand
schedules with the same constant slope and with an intercept that is the same linear
function of individual state variables. The individual state variables will be Dt, Xnt ,
and St . The precise formulation is given in the next definitions.
Definition 2.1.3. A profile of demand schedules {(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )} is said
to be linear symmetric if ∃ a, λ, b, c, ξ ∈ R s.t.
αnt = aX
n
t + bDt + cSt + ξ (2.9)
βnt = λ (2.10)
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∀t ≥ 0, ∀n = 1, · · · , N .
Definition 2.1.4. We say that a, λ, b, c, ξ ∈ R are a linear symmetric Nash equilib-
rium if the linear symmetric profile defined by (9) and (10) is a Nash equilibrium
starting from any set of initial conditions.
For the rest of the chapter we focus only on linear symmetric Nash equilibria. Our
goal will be to classify all such equilibria and to study the dynamics of prices and
trading rates in these equilibria. Before proceeding we prove the following lemma,
which states the for linear symmetric profiles the admissibility5 conditions manifest
in simple constraints on the parameters a and λ. One of the key points of the lemma
is that under a linear symmetric profile market makers can infer St from the history
of prices and valuations. The market makers are thus able to implement the demand
schedules (9) and (10) given their individual information sets.
Lemma 2.1.5. A linear symmetric profile is admissible if and only if λ > 0 and
a
λ <
ρ
2 .
Proof. Fix a linear symmetric profile given by a, λ, b, c, ξ ∈ R as in (9) and (10). We
need to show that the four conditions for admissibility in Definition 1.1 are satisfied
if and only if λ > 0 and aλ <
ρ
2 . Clearly the first condition holds if and only if λ > 0.
Next we will show that a profile satisfying (9) and (10) always satisfies the second
and fourth conditions. Finally we will show that the third condition holds if and only
if 2aλ < ρ, thus completing the proof of the lemma.
Note that by combining equations (9) and (10) with equations (2), (3) and (4) we can
conclude that prices, trading rates, and inventories under a linear symmetric profile
5Admissibility for a linear symmetric profile means that (9) and (10) are admissible given any
initial conditions.
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must satisfy
pt =
( a
N
+ c
)
St + bDt + ξ − λNNt (2.11)
Xnt = e
a
λ t
(
Xn0 −
S0
N
)
+
St
N
(2.12)
qnt =
a
λ
(
Xnt −
St
N
)
+
1
N
Nt (2.13)
∀t ≥ 0 and ∀n = 1, · · · , N . These formulas imply that trading rates are almost surely
continuous and thus the second condition holds.
To prove the fourth condition it suffices to prove that St ∈ σ
(
{Ds}0≤s≤t, {ps}0≤s<t, S0
)
∀t ≥ 0. Equation (11) implies that the following ODE holds path by path for the
process {St}:
dSt
dt
=
N
λ
( a
N
+ c
)
St +At,
where the process {At} is defined by
At = N
λ
(bDt + ξ − pt).
It’s clear from this definition that {As}0≤s<t ∈ σ
(
{Ds}0≤s≤t, {ps}0≤s<t, S0
)
∀t ≥ 0.
Furthermore the ODE above implies that
St = e
N
λ
(
a
N +c
)
t
S0 +
∫ t
0
e
N
λ
(
a
N +c
)
(t−s)Asds
from which it follows that St ∈ σ
(
{Ds}0≤s≤t, {ps}0≤s<t, S0
)
∀t ≥ 0.
Turning to the third condition for admissibility, note that (11) - (13) imply that under
a linear symmetric profile the integrand in (7) is of the form e−ρtQ(Xnt ,Dt,Nt, St),
where Q is a second order polynomial with an (Xnt )2 coefficient of −γσ
2
D
2 , 0 . Thus
∃ constants M0,M1,M2,M3,M4 > 0 such that
|Q(Xnt ,Dt,Nt, St)| ≤ M0 + M1
((Xnt )2 + D2t +N2t + S2t )
(Xnt )2 ≤ M2 + M3 |Q(Xnt ,Dt,Nt, St)| + M4(D2t +N2t + S2t )
∀t ≥ 0 almost surely. Equations (1), (5), and (8) imply that e−ρtD2t , e−ρtN2t , and
e−ρtS2t are integrable for any initial conditions. Thus from these bounds it follows
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that (7) converges absolutely for any initial conditions and for any n = 1, · · · , N if
and only if e−ρt(Xnt )2 is integrable for any initial conditions and for any n = 1, · · · , N .
From (12) it follows that this latter condition holds if and only if aλ <
ρ
2 . 
2.2 The Optimal Response Problem
This section formulates the optimal response problem for an individual market
maker as a standard stochastic control problem. A key point is that in forming an
optimal response, a market maker can optimize directly over his trading rate. This is
analogous to the idea in Chapter 1 of formulating the optimal response problem as
maximization against a linear supply curve.
Proposition 2.2.1. a, λ, b, c, ξ ∈ R are a linear symmetric Nash equilibrium if and
only if λ > 0, aλ <
ρ
2 , and for any initial conditions we have that
a
λ
(
Xt− StN
)
+
Nt
N
∈ argmax
{qt }
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
−qt(pt−Dt)+µXt−
γσ2D
2
(Xt)2
)
dt
]
, (2.14)
where pt is given by equation (15) below, the relevant dynamics are
dXt = qtdt
dDt = µdt + σDdBDt
dNt = −ψNtdt + σNdBNt
dSt = Ntdt
and the optimization is constrained to those processes {qt} such that
1.
∫ T
0 |qt |dt < ∞ ∀T ≥ 0
2. The double integral in (14) converges absolutely
3. qt ∈ σ({Du}0≤u≤t, {Su}0≤u≤t, {Xu}0≤u≤t, {Nu}0≤u≤t) ∀t ≥ 0.
Proof. To have a Nash equilibrium we must have a profile that satisfies the admissi-
bility and optimality conditions in Definition 1.2. Lemma 1.5 states that for a linearly
symmetric profile the admissibility condition holds if and only if λ > 0 and aλ <
ρ
2 .
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Thus to prove the proposition we need only show that the optimality condition holds
if and only if (14) holds.
Consider the optimal response problem of an individual market maker when facing
a linear symmetric profile of demand schedules given by a, λ, b, c, ξ ∈ R. Denote
the inventory process and trading rate process for the remaining market maker by
{Xt} and {qt}. If the remaining market maker chooses the demand schedule process
{(αt, βt)}, then his trading rate and the price process {pt} are given implicitly by
pt =
( a
N − 1 + c
)
St + bDt + ξ − λN − 1Nt −
a
N − 1Xt +
λ
N − 1qt (2.15)
pt = αt − βtqt . (2.16)
The optimal response problem for the remaining market maker is to choose the
demand schedule process {(αt, βt)} such that the profile of all agents’ schedules
is admissible6, and the objective in (14) is maximized over all such processes. In
computing the objective the relevant equations are (15), (16), and the differential
equations in the statement of the proposition. The optimality condition for Nash
equilibrium is satisfied if and only if for any set of initial conditions a maximizing
choice of demand schedule process is (αt, βt) = (aXt + bDt + cSt + ξ, λ). We now
make three points regarding this optimal response problem.
The first point is that the remaining market maker will be indifferent between any two
demand schedule processes leading to the same trading rate. Indeed for fixed initial
conditions, the objective in (14) depends on the choice of demand schedule process
only through the trading rate and price processes. Furthermore, from (15) we see
that the price process depends on the demand schedule processes only through the
trading rate process. Hence the objective is constant over demand schedule processes
leading to the same trading rate process.
The second point is that by choosing an appropriate admissible demand schedule, the
remaining market maker can achieve any trading rate satisfying the three conditions
6In the rest of the proof we will say that the remaining market maker’s demand schedule process
is admissible if the corresponding profile of all market makers’ demand schedules is admissible.
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in the proposition. To prove this it suffice to show that
St, Nt ∈ σ
(
{Ds}0≤s≤t, {ps}0≤s<t, {Xs}0≤s≤t, {qs}0≤s<t, S0
)
∀t ≥ 0 (2.17)
for any choice of the remaining market maker’s demand schedule. If this is the case,
then for any {q˜t} satisfying the three conditions in the proposition we have that the
demand schedule process{(( a
N − 1 + c
)
St + bDt + ξ − λN − 1Nt −
a
N − 1Xt +
(
1 +
λ
N − 1
)
q˜t, 1
)}
is admissible, and by (15) and (16) it gives the remaining market maker the trading
rate process {qt} = {q˜t}.
To prove (17) it suffices to prove that
{Su}0≤u≤t ∈ σ
(
{Ds}0≤s≤t, {ps}0≤s<t, {Xs}0≤s≤t, {qs}0≤s<t, S0
)
∀t ≥ 0 (2.18)
for any choice of the remaining market maker’s demand schedule. This is because
by differentiating {Su}0≤u≤t we can recover {N}0≤u≤t . To prove (18) note that (15)
implies that for any choice of the remaining market maker’s demand schedule we
have
dSt
dt
=
N − 1
λ
( a
N − 1 + c
)
St +At
At = N − 1
λ
(
bDt + ξ − aN − 1Xt +
λ
N − 1qt − pt
)
.
From this (18) follows exactly as in Lemma 1.5.
The final point is that if the remaining market maker chooses the demand schedule
process (αt, βt) = (aXt + bDt + cSt + ξ, λ), then his trading rate is
qt =
a
λ
(
Xt − StN
)
+
Nt
N
(2.19)
∀t ≥ 0. Indeed (19) follows simply by plugging (αt, βt) in (15) - (16) and solving for
qt .
This third point shows that if the remainingmarket maker follows the linear symmetric
profile, then his trading rate is the maximizer in (14). The first two points imply
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that solving the optimal response problem against a linear symmetric profile is the
same as solving the constrained optimization problem in the proposition. Hence the
proposition follows. 
This proposition associates to each linear symmetric profile a, λ, b, c, ξ ∈ R an
optimization problem, as well as a candidate solution of the problem. The parameters
provide an equilibrium if and only if the candidate is truly a solution. In the next
section we will use the theory of stochastic control to derive first order conditions for
the optimization problem. Using these we will demonstrate that there is a unique
profile for which the candidate is a true solution, and thus there is a unique linear
symmetric equilibrium.
Before proceeding, we establish some notation relevant to the proposition and it’s use
below. Given a set of parameters a, λ, b, c, ξ ∈ R, the optimization in the proposition
is a standard stochastic control problem on an infinite horizon, with state space
(x, d, η, s) ∈ R4 and control space q ∈ R. Denote the covariables for the problem by
y = (yx, yd, yη, ys) ∈ R4 and
z =
©­­­­­­­«
zxx zxd zxη zxs
zdx zdd zdη zds
zηx zηd zηη zηs
zsx zsd zsη zss
ª®®®®®®®¬
∈ R4×4.
The Hamiltonian for the problem is H : R4 × R4 × R4×4 × R→ R given by
H(x, d, η, s, y, z, q) = qyx + µyd − ψηyη + ηys +
σ2D
2
zdd +
σ2N
2
zηη + µx
− γσ
2
D
2
x2 − q (P(x, d, η, s, q) − d), (2.20)
where P : R4 × R→ R is the function specifying prices as a function of state and
control from (15) above, i.e.
P(x, d, η, s, q) =
( a
N − 1 + c
)
s + bd + ξ − λ
N − 1η −
a
N − 1 x +
λ
N − 1q. (2.21)
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Also denote by Q : R4 → R the mapping corresponding to the Markov control in
(14), i.e.
Q(x, d, η, s) = a
λ
(
x − s
N
) + η
N
. (2.22)
H and P describe the optimization problem, and Q is the candidate solution. The
functions H, P, and Q all depend on the parameters a, λ, b, c, and ξ, but this
dependence is suppressed in the notation.
2.3 Equilibrium Characterization
Theorem 2.3.1. Fix exogenous parameters N ≥ 3, ρ, γ, σD, σN, ψ > 0, and µ ∈ R.
There is a uique linear symmetric Nash equilibrium with price
pt = Dt +
µ
ρ
− 1
ρ
γ
N
σ2DSt −
γ
N
N − 1
2
σ2D
δ(δ − ρ2 )
Nt
and trading rates
qnt = −(δ −
ρ
2
)
(
Xnt −
St
N
)
+
1
N
Nt,
where
δ :=
1
2
√
ρ2 + 2ρ(ρ + ψ)(N − 2).
Proof. We will prove that a, λ, b, c, ξ ∈ R are a linear symmetric Nash equilibrium if
and only if
a = −N − 1
δ
γσ2D (2.23)
λ =
N − 1
N − 2
γσ2D
ρ + ψ
(1
δ
+
1
ρ
)
(2.24)
b = 1 (2.25)
c = −1
ρ
γσ2D
N
+
N − 1
δ
γσ2D
N
(2.26)
ξ =
µ
ρ
(2.27)
Equilibrium prices and trading rates are given by (11) - (13), and plugging in these
values gives the formulas in the statement of the theorem.
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We begin by proving the only if part of the statement. To this end, suppose the
parameters a, λ, b, c, ξ ∈ R are a linear symmetric Nash equilibrium. Denote by
V(x, d, η, s) the value function of the optimization problem in Proposition 2.1, i.e.
the value of the supremum in (14) when the initial conditions are (X0,D0,N0, S0) =
(x, d, η, s).
Note that the value function is smooth. Indeed because the parameters provide an
equilibrium, (14) must hold, and thereforeV(x, d, η, s) can be computed by evaluating
the objective in (14) along the control process aλ
(
Xt − StN
)
+
Nt
N . This provides us
with an explicit expression for V , and by direct inspection it follows that V is smooth.
It follows that V satisfies the following HJB equation:
ρV(x, d, η, s) = sup
q∈R
H(x, d, η, s,∇V,∇2V, q) ∀(x, d, η, s) ∈ R4. (2.28)
Furthermore, since Q is an optimal Markov control, it also follows that
Q(x, d, η, s) ∈ argmax
q∈R
H(x, d, η, s,∇V,∇2V, q) ∀(x, d, η, s) ∈ R4. (2.29)
(28) is the classical result that if the value function is smooth then it satisfies the HJB
equation [Tou13]. When an optimal Markov control is known to exist, one way to
prove (28) is to first prove (29) [Car16]. A lemma explicitly proving (29) is included
in the appendix to this chapter for completeness.
The first order condition for (29) is
Vx(x, d, η, s) = P
(
x, d, η, s,Q(x, d, η, s)) − d+ λ
N − 1Q(x, d, η, s) ∀(x, d, η, s) ∈ R
4.
(2.30)
Anti-differentiating (30) it follows that ∃ a smooth function w : R3 → R such that
V(x, d, η, s) = 1
2
a
N − 1 x
2+(b−1)xd−
( N − 2
N(N − 1)λ
)
xη+
( N − 2
N(N − 1)a+c
)
xs+ξx
+ w(d, η, s) (2.31)
∀(x, d, η, s) ∈ R4.
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In summary, we’ve shown that if a, λ, b, c, ξ ∈ R are a linear symmetric Nash
equilibrium then (28) - (31) hold. Combining these equations, we conclude that ∃ a
smooth function w : R3 → R such that
ρ
2
a
N − 1 x
2+ρ(b−1)xd−ρ N − 2
N(N − 1)λxη+ρ
( N − 2
N(N − 1)a+c
)
xs+ρξx+ρw(d, η, s)
=
( a2
λ(N − 1) −
γσ2D
2
)
x2 +
( a
N − 1 +
N − 2
N(N − 1)ψλ + c
)
xη − 2a
2
N(N − 1)λ xs + µbx
+ µwd − ψηwη + ηws +
σ2D
2
wdd +
σ2N
2
wηη +
λ
(N − 1)N2
(
η − a
λ
s
)2
(2.32)
∀(x, d, η, s) ∈ R4.
It remains to be shown that (32) implies (23) - (27). Note that since the function w
is independent of x, the coefficients of x2, xd, xη, xs, and x must be equal on the
left and right hand sides of (32). Equating the coefficients of xd and x immediately
gives (25) and (27). Equating the remaining coefficients yields the algebraic system
ρ
2
a
N − 1 =
a2
λ(N − 1) −
γσ2D
2
(2.33)
−ρ N − 2
N(N − 1)λ =
a
N − 1 +
N − 2
N(N − 1)ψλ + c (2.34)
ρ
( N − 2
N(N − 1)a + c
)
= − 2a
2
N(N − 1)λ . (2.35)
Using equations (33) and (35) we can solve for c in terms of a to get c = − aN − 1ρ γNσ2D.
From this equation it follows that if (23) and (24) hold then so too does (26).
Next we plug this expression for c into (34) and solve for λ in terms of a to get
λ = − 1ρ+ψ
(
a
N−2 − N−1N−2
γσ2D
ρ
)
. From this equation it follows that if (23) holds then
so too does (24). Hence it only remains to prove that (23) holds. Plugging this
expression for λ into (33), we see that a must satisfy a2 = (N−1)
2γ2σ4D
δ2
. Now, because
the parameters provide an equilibrium, the constraint 2aλ < ρmust hold. The positive
root for a violates the constraint and the negative root satisfies it, so it follows that
(23) holds.
We now prove the if part of the statement. To this end, suppose that a, b, c, ξ, and λ
are given by equations (23) - (27). We need to show (14) holds, i.e. that the mapping
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Q in (22) provides an optimal Markov control for the stochastic control problem in
Proposition 2.1. This will be done by by using the verification theorem for the HJB
equation [Pha09].
Given a set of initial conditions, denote by {qˆt} and {Xˆt} the trading rate and
inventory processes arising from using the Markov control given by Q, i.e. dXˆt =
Q(Xˆt,Dt,Nt, St)dt and qˆt = Q(Xˆt,Dt,Nt, St). These processes depend on the choice
of initial conditions, but this is suppressed in the notation. We need to show that ∃ a
smooth function V(x, d, η, s) such that
1. (28) holds
2. (29) holds
3. e−ρtE[V(Xˆt,Dt,Nt, St)] → 0 as t →∞ for any choice of initial conditions
4. {qˆt} satisfies the the constraints in Proposition 3.1 for any choice of initial
conditions.
If this can be done then it follows by the verification theorem that Q is an optimal
Markov control for the stochastic control problem in Proposition 2.1.
Note that we can find a second order polynomial w(d, η, s) that satisfies the equation
ρw = µwd − ψηwη + ηws +
σ2D
2
wdd +
σ2N
2
wηη +
λ
(N − 1)N2
(
η − a
λ
s
)2
on all of R3. Now define the functionV(x, d, η, s) by equation (31). Then the function
V is smooth and by construction equations (30) and (32) hold. Notice that as a
function of q the Hamiltonian is a quadratic polynomial with leading coefficient
− λN−1 . Since λ > 0 it follows that (30) is not only a necessary condition for (29) but
also a sufficient one. Thus (29) holds. This implies that the equation (28) is precisely
the equation (32), and so (28) also holds.
SinceV is a second order polynomial, in order to prove the third condition it suffices to
show that E[e−ρt Xˆ2t ], E[e−ρtD2t ], E[e−ρtN2t ], and E[e−ρtS2t ] converge to 0 as t →∞
for any set of initial conditions. This follows from the fact that 2aλ < ρ and ψ > 0.
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Finally, we need to check that {qˆt} satisfies the constraints in Proposition 3.1. The
third constraint is trivial since qˆt = Q(Xˆt,Dt,Nt, St). This formula also implies {qˆt}
is almost surely continuous, and thus the first condition holds. Lastly, the second
condition holds because 2aλ < ρ and ψ > 0. 
2.4 Equilibrium Analysis
Price Analysis
Consider the equilibrium price process given in Theorem 3.1. The four terms admit
intuitive economic interpretations. The first term Dt is simply the market makers’
current valuation for the asset. The second term µρ is a premium for expected valuation
growth. µ is the drift of valuations, so on average valuations increase by µ(T − t)
over a time interval [t,T]. As this is common knowledge among the market makers,
this must be reflected in the price at time t. Otherwise, a profitable deviation from
equilibrium would be to buy the asset at time t and sell it at time T . Since market
makers discount payoffs from time T to time t by e−ρ(T−t), the appropriate premium
in the price to prevent this deviation is µρ . Said another way, we have7
µ
ρ
= Et
[ ∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(T−t)dDT
]
.
Thus the second term is the (risk-neutral) present value of expected future changes in
the asset’s value.
Since the market makers are not risk neutral, they also require risk compensations to
take exposures to the asset. This is the role of the third term in the price − 1ρ
γσ2D
N St .
When the market makers are in aggregate long the asset, so St is positive, this term
is negative and thus the asset is trading at a relatively low price. Because the asset
is trading at a low price, market makers don’t find it profitable to deviate from
equilibrium by selling the asset to reduce their exposures. Similarly, when the market
makers are in aggregate short the asset, this term causes the asset to trade at a high
price, and thus market makers don’t find it profitable to buy the asset to reduce their
exposures.
7The notation here and below is Et [·] := E[·|Ft ].
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The magnitude of the compensation per unit of exposure is given by 1ρ
γσ2D
N . σ
2
D
is the volatility of valuations, so this is the amount of risk per unit of exposure
to the asset. γN is the aggregate risk aversion of the market makers, so this is the
dollar compensation they require to hold a unit of risk. Thus γσ
2
D
N is the dollar
compensation the market makers require to hold a unit of exposure to the asset.
The presence of 1ρ suggests a discounted present value interpretation, but it is not
straightforward to write this term as a discounted present value like the second term.
This is partly because this term is not the full risk compensation market makers
require, as discussed a few paragraphs below.
The final term in the price process is − γN N−12
σ2D
δ(δ− ρ2 )
Nt , which is the price impact the
liquidity traders face on their trades, or equivalently the slope of the supply curve
they face when trading. The liquidity traders submit market orders to trade at rate
−Nt , so they are buying when Nt < 0 and selling when Nt > 0. When the liquidity
traders are buying, price impact causes the trading price to be high, and when the
liquidity traders are selling, price impact causes the trading price to be low. This
is the model’s analogue of liquidity traders’ market orders walking the book. As
suggested by Kyle, we define liquidity in the model as the reciprocal of price impact
and study it’s comparative statics.
Definition 2.4.1. Price Impact := γN
N−1
2
σ2D
δ(δ− ρ2 )
Definition 2.4.2. Liquidity := 1Price Impact
Proposition 2.4.3. 1. ∂∂γ Liquidity < 0.
Liquidity is decreasing in market makers’ risk aversion.
2. ∂∂σD Liquidity < 0.
Liquidity is decreasing in fundamental volatility.
3. If γN is held fixed then
∂
∂N Liquidity > 0.
Liquidity is increasing in market maker competition.
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4. ∂∂ψ Liquidity > 0.
Liquidity is decreasing in order flow uncertainty.
To understand the fourth point, recall that the liquidity traders’ order flow is given
by {Nt}, which is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process whose stationary distribution
has variance σ
2
N
2ψ . Thus as ψ increases, the liquidity traders’ orders arrive with less
uncertainty.
These comparative statics agree with real word intuition about liquidity, and thus
they justify the theoretical definition of liquidity. Put simply, liquidity should reflect
market makers’ willingness to absorb temporary flow. Market makers are less willing
to absorb temporary flow when they are more risk averse, when the asset is riskier,
when there are not many of them, or when order flow is more uncertain. By the
proposition, liquidity is also lower in the model in these situations.
Next we study what happens to price impact in the competitive limit of the model.
This is the limit when N →∞ and γN → γ0. Essentially one considers the sequence
of models with N market makers each having risk aversion γN := Nγ0. Thus for any
model in the sequence, the aggregate risk aversion of the market makers is γNN = γ0.
Hence the sequence considers increasingly competitive market making sectors that
in aggregate have the same risk bearing capacity. Taking the limit of the sequence
provides a perfectly competitive benchmark for the model.
Proposition 2.4.4. In the competitive limit, we have that
Price Impact → γ0
ρ
σ2D
ρ + ψ
and
pt → Dt + µ
ρ
− Et
[ ∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(T−t)γ0σ2DSTdT
]
∀(t, ω) ∈ [0,∞) ×Ω
That price impact does not vanish in the competitive limit is somewhat surprising.
Naive intuition would suggest that market makers exercise their market power by
charging price impact. So in the competitive limit, when individual market makers
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no longer have market power, price impact should vanish. The reason this intuition
does not hold is given by the limiting value of the equilibrium price.
In the competitive limit, market makers have an aggregate risk aversion of γ0 > 0,
so the equilibrium price should consist of a risk neutral present value as well as a
discount based on the market makers’ aggregate exposure. The first two terms in the
limiting price, Dt + µρ , are a risk neutral present value as discussed above. Thus the
third term −Et
[ ∫ ∞
t e
−ρ(T−t)γ0σ2DSTdT
]
should be the appropriate risk discount.
As discussed above, ST is the aggregate exposure of the market makers at time
T , and −γ0σ2DST is the dollar compensation they require in order to maintain this
exposure. However, because ST evolves with T , this is only the exposure over the
infinitesimal time interval [T,T + dt]. Furthermore, standing at time t, market
makers require a compensation for the entire path of exposures they will be taking
over [t,∞). The appropriate compensation for the exposure over [T,T + dt] is
γ0σ
2
DST , and market makers discount payoffs from time T to time t by e
−ρ(T−t),
so the appropriate compensation for the entire path of exposures over [t,∞) is
−Et
[ ∫ ∞
t e
−ρ(T−t)γ0σ2DSTdT
]
.
Said another way, the third term is exactly what is needed to prevent market makers
deviating from equilibrium by pursuing a strategy that buys/sells based on the current
level of the aggregate exposure. If ST does not evolve with T and has a constant
value equal to S, then this term reads − 1ργ0σ2DS. This is exactly the risk discount a
representative CARA investor with risk aversion γ0 and time discount rate ρ would
require to hold S shares of an asset with volatility σ2D.
Based on this analysis, we can conclude, as suggested previously, that − 1ρ
γσ2D
N St is
not the full risk compensation component of the equilibrium price, but instead that
−Et
[ ∫ ∞
t e
−ρ(T−t)γ0σ2DSTdT
]
is. Thus part of the price impact component of prices
compensates market makers for risk, and so it does not vanish in the competitive limit.
The rest of the price impact component of prices is a manifestation of market makers’
market power, and so it does vanish in the competitive limit. The interpretation is
that market makers charge price impact for (at least) two reasons. The first reason is
37
simply because they can, since they have market power, and doing so is profitable.
The second reason is that incoming trades change the entire path of exposures that
market makers will be taking going forward. In order for the market makers to find it
utility maximizing to clear the incoming trade, this must be reflected in the trading
price.
Inventory Analysis
Next consider the equilibrium trading rates given in Theorem 3.1. The two terms
encode two important properties of the market makers’ equilibrium trading behavior.
The first is that in aggregate the market makers must buy at rateNt , or equivalently the
average trading rate of the market makers must be 1NNt . This is simply a consequence
of market clearing, since the liquidity traders are selling at rate Nt . That this is
indeed the case is guaranteed by the second term in the formula for trading rates; the
first terms all cancel out when aggregating/averaging.
The first term in the trading rates dictates which market makers buy more/less than
the average. Note that δ > ρ2 , so the market makers with inventories larger than
St
N buy less, and vice versa. This brings us to the second important property of
the market makers’ trading behavior: they are continually moving towards a Pareto
optimal allocation amongst themselves. The market makers must in aggregate hold
St shares, simply by market clearing. Since they are all identical, it would be Pareto
optimal for everyone to hold StN shares. However, this certainly can’t hold at time 0,
as initial inventories are exogenous and arbitrary. Beyond time 0 efficiency of the
allocations depends on endogenous trading behavior.
Using the formula for trading rates, we can compute that in equilibrium the trajectory
of each market maker’s inventory is
Xnt = e
−(δ− ρ2 )t(Xn0 −
S0
N
) + St
N
.
Thus each market maker deviates from the efficient allocation by the first term. This
term is non-zero if and only if Xn0 ,
S0
N , and in this case it converges monotonically
towards 0 over time. Thus the market makers take as given the inefficiency in their
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initial allocations, and then trade amongst themselves to make allocations more
efficient. Allocations are inefficient at time t is because they were inefficient at time
0; the endogenous trading behavior of the market makers does not in any way create
allocational inefficiencies.
But the market makers’ trading behavior also does not perfectly remove the initial
inefficiency in allocations. Indeed, inventories converge to efficiency at an exponential
rate of δ − ρ2 , and this rate is not infinite. Based on the formula for δ, we see that the
two main drivers of this rate are ψ, governing the uncertainty in order flow, and N ,
governing the degree of competition. As ψ →∞, so order flow uncertainty vanishes,
or as N →∞, so the market is perfectly competitive, this rate of convergence goes
to infinity.
The story here is essentially one of individual market makers behaving strategically
in an attempt to earn profits. Note that the price in the absence of liquidity trades
(Nt = 0), interpreted as the mid-price, is Dt + µρ − 1ρ γNσ2DSt . Any market maker
holding more than StN shares should find this price high relative to his exposure and
should want to sell, and vice versa. However, market makers take into account price
impact, so they know they can’t actually trade to StN at this price. The market makers
also know that at any moment a random liquidity trade might come in and move
their exposure in the right direction, but now without price impact8. Thus instead
of trading all the way to StN , market makers only move partially and take the chance
that the liquidity traders’ flow will move them the rest of the way. In the absence of
order flow uncertainty, or under perfect competition, the market makers no longer go
through this calculation and simply trade all the way to StN , converging instantly to
efficiency (i.e. at an infinite rate).
2.5 Appendix: A Stochastic Control Lemma
Fix a filtered probability space (Ω, F , {Ft}, P) equipped with a d-dimensional Brow-
nian motion {Bt} and satisfying the usual conditions. Consider a standard infinite
8More specifically, price impact favors the market maker in this situation, as his limit order is
getting hit by an incoming liquidity trader market order. If the market maker was insistent on moving
to StN , then he would have to place a market order, so price impact would go against him.
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horizon stochastic control problem with state space RS, control space RA, and
randomness coming from {Bt}. Thus we take as given mappings b : RS × RA→ RS,
σ : RS ×RA→ RS×d , and f : RS ×RA→ R. We assume that b and σ are uniformly
Lipschitz in their first variables and that f is Borel measurable. Also fix a constant
β > 0.
Denote byA the set of progressively measurable RA valued processes α = {αt} such
that
E
[ ∫ T
0
|b(0, αt)2 + |σ(0, αt)|2dt
]
∀T > 0.
Given x ∈ RS and α = {αt} ∈ A, denote by X x,α = {X x,αt } the unique strong
solution9 to the SDE
dXt = b(Xt, αt)dt + σ(Xt, αt)dBt
X0 = x.
For each x ∈ RS denote by A(x) the subset of α = {αt} ∈ A such that
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−βt | f (X x,αt , αt)|dt
]
< ∞
and assume that A(x) is nonempty ∀x ∈ RS.
For x ∈ RS and α = {αt} ∈ A(x) define the cost functional by
J(x, α) = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−βt f (X x,αt , αt)dt
]
.
The value function is defined for x ∈ RS by
V(x) = sup
α∈A(x)
J(x, α).
We also define the Hamiltonian H : RS × RS × RS×S × RA→ R by
H(x, y, z, a) = b(x, a) · y + 1
2
trace
(
σ(x, a))σT (x, a)z) + f (x, a).
9The assumptions on b and σ and the definition of A were made precisely so that this equation
admits a unique strong solution [Pha09].
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The significance of the Hamiltonian is that it describes how functions of a controlled
state process evolve over time. That is, by Ito’s formula, for any α = {αt} ∈ A,
h > 0 and g ∈ C1,2 ([0,∞) × RS) we have that
g(t + h, X x,αt+h) − g(t, X x,αt ) =
∫ t+h
t
∂g
∂t
(s, X x,αs ) + H
(
X x,αs ,∇g(s, X x,αs ),∇2g(s, X x,αs ), αs
)
− f (X x,αs , αs) ds + Martingale.
Definition 2.5.1. We say that a : RS → RA is an optimal Markov control if
∀x ∈ RS, ∃αˆx = {αˆxt } ∈ argmaxα∈A(x) J(x, α) such that αˆxt = a
(
X x,αˆ
x
t
) ∀t ≥ 0
almost surely.
Lemma 2.5.2. Suppose that V ∈ C2(RS) and H is continuous. If a : RS → RA is
continuous and provides an optimal Markov control then
a(x) ∈ argmax
a˜∈RA
H(x,∇V(x),∇2V(x), a˜) ∀x ∈ RS .
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that the conclusion of the theorem
does not hold. Then ∃x0 ∈ RS, a˜0 ∈ RA and  > 0 such that
H(x0,∇V(x0),∇2V(x0), a(x0)) < H(x0,∇V(x0),∇2V(x0), a˜0) − 4 .
By continuity of a, H and V it follows that ∃ a neighborhood U1 of x0 such that
H(x,∇V(x),∇2V(x), a(x)) < H(x,∇V(x),∇2V(x), a˜0) − 3 ∀x ∈ U1. (2.36)
Let {Xt} be the unique strong solution to the SDE
dXt = b(Xt, a(Xt))dt + σ(Xt, a(Xt))dBt
X0 = x0
and let {X˜t} be the unique strong solution to the SDE
dX˜t = b(X˜t, a˜0)dt + σ(X˜t, a˜0)dBt
X˜0 = x0.
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Note that by smoothness of V and continuity of H we can find neighborhoods U2
and U3 of x0 such that
|V(x) − V(y)| < 
β
∀x, y ∈ U2 (2.37)
|H(x,∇V(x),∇2V(x), a˜0) − H(y,∇V(y),∇2V(y), a˜0)| <  ∀x, y ∈ U3. (2.38)
Define the stopping time τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : (Xt, X˜t) < U1 ∩U2 ∩U3 ×U1 ∩U2 ∩U3}.
Since the processes {Xt} and {X˜t} have a.s. continuous paths it follows that
τ > 0 (2.39)
almost surely.
Now, we can estimate
V(x0) = E
[ ∫ τ
0
e−βt f (Xt, a(Xt))dt + e−βτV(Xτ)
]
= V(x0) + E
[ ∫ τ
0
e−βt
(
H
(
Xt,∇V(Xt),∇2V(Xt), a(Xt)
) − βV(Xt))dt]
≤ V(x0) + E
[ ∫ τ
0
e−βt
(
H
(
Xt,∇V(Xt),∇2V(Xt), a˜0
) − 3 − βV(Xt))dt]
≤ V(x0) + E
[ ∫ τ
0
e−βt
(
H
(
X˜t,∇V(X˜t),∇2V(X˜t), a˜0
)
+  − 3 − βV(X˜t) + 
)
dt
]
= E
[ ∫ τ
0
e−βt f (X˜t, a˜0)dt + e−βτV(X˜τ)
]
− 
β
E[1 − e−βτ]
≤ V(x0) − 
β
E[1 − e−βτ].
The first equality uses the dynamic programing principle [Pha09] and the optimality
of the Markov control given by a. The second and last equality use Ito’s lemma.
The last inequality uses the dynamic programming principle. The inequalities in the
middle follow from the definition of τ and inequalities (36) - (38). Since β > 0, it
follows from this estimate that E[e−βτ] ≥ 1. However, this contradicts (39). 
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C h a p t e r 3
MEAN REVERTING LIQUIDITY TRADERS
In this chapter we consider the same model as in chapter two, but we modify the
dynamics of the liquidity traders’ market orders so that their inventories mean revert
about zero. As before, market makers submit demand schedules at each instant in
time, and then their trading rates and the trading price are determined by
αnt − βnt qnt = pt ∀n = 1, · · · , N
q1t + · · · + qNt = Nt .
Here −Nt is the current trading rate of the liquidity traders, interpreted as a market
order to sell Ntdt shares over the time interval [t, t + dt]. The liquidity traders’ time
t inventory is then −St , where St = S0 +
∫ t
0 Nsds and −S0 is their initial inventory.
Since the asset is in zero net supply, {St} is the supply process faced by the market
making sector, i.e. St = X1t + · · · + XNt ∀t ≥ 0, where Xnt is the time t inventory of
each market maker.
In chapter two we took {Nt} to be an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, which meant that
the long run expectation of {St}, conditional on the present, was not necessarily zero.
Here we instead take
Nt = −φ(St − S˜t)
dS˜t = −ψS˜tdt + σS˜dBS˜t ,
where φ, ψ, σS˜ > 0.
The interpretation is that −S˜t is the current inventory target of the liquidity traders,
and φ governs the speed with which they trade towards their target. Thus when their
current inventory is above the target, −St > −S˜t , the liquidity traders submit market
orders to sell, Nt > 0, and vice versa. If φ is large, the liquidity traders are impatient
and submit large market orders to quickly reach their target. If φ is small, the liquidity
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traders are patient, submit smaller market orders, and only move slowly towards their
target. One can think of −S˜t as the inventory the liquidity traders would want to hold
if markets were perfectly liquid. Due to illiquidity they cannot instantly acquire this
inventory, and instead do so gradually. Note that since {S˜t} mean reverts about zero,
so too does {St}, i.e. we have E[ST |St, S˜t] → 0 as T →∞ almost surely ∀t ≥ 0.
The rest of the model is exactly as before. We work on a filtered probability space
equipped with two independent Brownian motions, one driving the inventory target
process, {BS˜t }, and the other driving the valuation process, {BDt }. Valuations follow
an arithmetic Brownian motion, market makers’ trading rates are the time derivatives
of their inventories, and market makers’ objectives are exactly as before. The initial
conditions for the game are X10 , · · · , XN0 , D0 and S˜0. The definitions of admissible
profiles, Nash equilibrium, linear symmetric profiles, and linear symmetric Nash
equilibrium are precisely as before.
Lemma 1.5. carries through verbatim and the analogue to the optimal response
proposition is below. The proofs are omitted as they are essentially identical to those
in chapter two. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to characterizing and analyzing
linear symmetric Nash equilibria of the model.
Proposition 3.0.1. a, λ, b, c, ξ ∈ R are a linear symmetric Nash equilibrium if and
only if λ > 0, aλ <
ρ
2 , and for any initial conditions we have that
a
λ
(
Xt− StN
)
− φ
N
(St− S˜t) ∈ argmax
{qt }
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
−qt(pt−Dt)+µXt−
γσ2D
2
(Xt)2
)
dt
]
,
(3.1)
where
pt =
( a
N − 1 + c +
λφ
N − 1
)
St + bDt + ξ − λφN − 1 S˜t −
a
N − 1Xt +
λ
N − 1qt .
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The relevant dynamics are
dXt = qtdt
dDt = µdt + σDdBDt
dS˜t = −ψS˜tdt + σS˜dBS˜t
dSt = −φ(St − S˜t)tdt
and the optimization is constrained to those processes {qt} such that
1.
∫ T
0 |qt |dt < ∞ ∀T ≥ 0
2. The double integral on the right side of (1) converges absolutely
3. qt ∈ σ({Du}0≤u≤t, {Su}0≤u≤t, {Xu}0≤u≤t, {S˜u}0≤u≤t) ∀t ≥ 0.
3.1 Equilibrium Characterization
Theorem 3.1.1. Fix exogenous parameters N ≥ 3, ρ, γ, σD, φ, ψ, σS˜ > 0 and µ ∈ R.
There is a unique linear symmetric Nash equilibrium with price
pt = Dt +
µ
ρ
− θ γσ
2
D
N
St − γN
N − 1
N − 2
ρσ2D
(ρ + ψ)(ρ + φ)
(1
δ
+
1
ρ
)
Nt
and trading rates
qnt = −κ
(
Xnt −
St
N
)
+
1
N
Nt,
where
κ := ρ(N − 2) ρ + ψ
ρ + δ
δ :=
√
ρ2 + 2(N − 2)(ρ + ψ)(ρ + φ)
θ :=
(ρ + ψ + φ)δ − ψφ
(ρ + ψ)(ρ + φ) .
Proof. The proof uses Proposition 1 and stochastic control theory analogously to
the proof in Chapter 2. The state space for the optimization in Proposition 1 is
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(x, d, s˜, s) ∈ R4, the control space is q ∈ R and the Hamiltonian is
H(x, d, s˜, s, y, z, q) = qyx + µyd − ψ s˜ys˜ − φ(s − s˜)ys +
σ2D
2
zdd +
σ2
S˜
2
zs˜s˜ + µx
− γσ
2
D
2
x2 − q (P(x, d, s˜, s, q) − d) .
Here P : R4 × R→ R is given by
P(x, d, s˜, s, q) =
( a
N − 1 + c +
λφ
N − 1
)
s + bd + ξ − λφ
N − 1 s˜ −
a
N − 1 x +
λ
N − 1q.
Denote by Q : R4 → R the candidate optimal Markov control given in in the
proposition, i.e.
Q(x, d, s˜, s) = a
λ
(
x − s
N
) − φ
N
(s − s˜).
We will prove that a, λ, b, c, ξ ∈ R are a linear symmetric Nash equilibrium if and
only if
a = −N − 1
δ
γσ2D (3.2)
λ =
N − 1
N − 2
ργσ2D
(ρ + ψ)(ρ + φ)
(1
δ
+
1
ρ
)
(3.3)
b = 1 (3.4)
c = − ρ(ρ + ψ + φ)(ρ + ψ)(ρ + φ)
γσ2D
N
(1
δ
+
1
ρ
)
+
γσ2D
δ
(3.5)
ξ =
µ
ρ
. (3.6)
The equations from Chapter 2 relating equilibrium prices and trading rates to
equilibrium values of a, λ, b, c, ξ continue to hold. Plugging in (2)-(6) gives the
formulas in the theorem.
Beginning with the if part of the statement, suppose the parameters a, λ, b, c, ξ ∈ R
are a linear symmetric Nash equilibrium. As in chapter two, it follows that the
Hamiltonian H, the optimal Markov control Q and the value function V are related
by
ρV(x, d, s˜, s) = sup
q∈R
H(x, d, s˜, s,∇V,∇2V, q) ∀(x, d, s˜, s) ∈ R4 (3.7)
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and
Q(x, d, s˜, s) ∈ argmax
q∈R
H(x, d, s˜, s,∇V,∇2V, q) ∀(x, d, s˜, s) ∈ R4. (3.8)
As before, we can anti-differentiate the first order condition for (8) to obtain an
expression for the value function in terms of an auxiliary smooth function w(d, s˜, s).
Once again we feed this expression for V back in to the HJB (7) and equate like
terms, using the fact that w is independent of x. This immediately gives (4) and (6),
as well as the following system for a, λ and c:
ρ
2
a
N − 1 =
a2
λ(N − 1) −
γσ2D
2
(3.9)
−ρ N − 2
N(N − 1)λ =
a
N − 1 +
N − 2
N(N − 1) (ψ + φ)λ + c (3.10)
ρ
( N − 2
N(N − 1) (a + λφ) + c
)
= − 2a
2
N(N − 1)λ −
N − 2
N(N − 1)φ
2λ − φ
( a
N − 1 + c
)
.
(3.11)
This system can be solved for a, λ and c by following the exact same procedure used
in the proof of Chapter 2. This yields two possible values for a, but only the one
given in (2) satisfies the constraint aλ <
ρ
2 . This proves the if portion of the statement.
Turning to the only if part of the statement, suppose that a, b, c, ξ, and λ are given by
equations (2) - (6). As in chapter 2, we will use the verification theorem to show that
(1) holds. Note that we can find a second order polynomial w(d, s˜, s) that satisfies
the equation
ρw = µwd−ψ s˜ws˜−φ(s−s˜)ws+
σ2D
2
wdd+
σ2
S˜
2
ws˜s˜+
(
φ
N
√
λ
N − 1 (s−s˜)+
a
N
1√
λ(N − 1)
s
)2
on all of R3. Consider the expression for the value function derived in the if portion
of the proof above. Insert this w as the auxiliary function there, and then define V
using that expression. Then by constructionV satisfies (7) and (8), with the first order
condition for (8) being sufficient because λ > 0. The admissibility and transversality
conditions hold because aλ <
ρ
2 . Thus (1) follows by the verification theorem. 
Below is a simple corollary that will be used in the next chapter.
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Corollary 3.1.2. Suppose that we instead take Nt = −φ(St − piS˜t) for some pi , 0.
Then the characterization of linear symmetric Nash equilibria is unchanged.
Proof. Define ˜˜St := piS˜t . Then we have
Nt = −φ(St − ˜˜St)
d ˜˜St = −ψ ˜˜St + piσS˜dBS˜t .
Thus the model is exactly as above except with σS˜ replaced with piσS˜. Since the
equilibrium parameters found in the theorem above don’t depend on σS˜, it follows
that the characterization of linear symmetric equilibria is unchanged. 
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C h a p t e r 4
ENDOGENOUS LIQUIDITY TRADERS
In this chapter we endogenize the liquidity traders’ market order process and derive
it as the result of an optimization problem. As in Chapters 2 and 3, the central
equations determining the trading price and trading rates at each instant in time are
αnt − βnt qnt = pt ∀n = 1, · · · , N
q1t + · · · + qNt = Nt .
The demand schedules {(αnt , βnt )} are the control processes of each market maker,
and are chosen to maximize
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
− qnt (pt − Dt) −
γσ2D
2
(Xnt )2
)
dt
]
. (4.1)
The market orders to sell {Nt} are the control process of the liquidity traders, and
are chosen to maximize
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
Nt(pt − Dt) −
θσ2D
2
(St − S˜t)2
)
dt
]
. (4.2)
Here Xnt is the inventory of each market maker and −St is the inventory of the
liquidity traders, which evolve according to
dXnt = q
n
t dt (4.3)
dSt = Ntdt . (4.4)
Dt is the exogenous valuation of the asset shared by all agents, and it evolves
according to1
dDt = σDdBDt . (4.5)
S˜t is an exogenous component of the liquidity traders’ inventory, and it evolves
according to
dS˜t = −ψS˜tdt + σS˜dBS˜t . (4.6)
1In this chapter we set the drift of the valuation, µ, equal to 0 for simplicity. Including the drift
does not have a material effect on the results.
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{BDt } and {BS˜t } are independent Brownian motions.
The justification for the liquidity traders’ objective function is as follows. Firstly,
the liquidity traders’ inventory is −St and it’s derivative, the trading rate of the
liquidity traders, is −Nt . Thus Nt is the selling rate of the liquidity traders, as it’s
the negative derivative of their inventory. This is why the first term in the liquidity
traders’ objective function, Nt(pt − Dt), corresponding to costs from trading, does
not have a minus sign like the corresponding term in (1). In contrast, qnt is the buying
rate of the market makers, as it’s the positive derivative of their inventories.
Secondly, we assume that in addition to the inventory built from trading on the
exchange, the liquidity traders also have another inventory of S˜t , perhaps from trading
with clients. Thus the aggregate inventory of the liquidity traders is −St + S˜t , and so
their quadratic inventory holding costs are (−St + S˜t)2 = (St − S˜t)2. The risk aversion
parameter of the liquidity traders is θ, giving rise to the second term in their objective
function.
This sets up the model as a stochastic differential game between the N market
makers and the liquidity traders. The initial conditions for the game are the initial
conditions for equations (3), (5) and (6). Since the asset is in zero net supply, the
initial conditions for (3) also provide an initial condition for (4): S0 = X10 + · · · XN0 .
We are interested in studying the Nash equilibria of this game.
As before, it’s necessary to specify admissibility conditions for the agents’ controls,
and also to place restrictions on the class of equilibria that will be studied. This
is all fairly analogous to chapter two, but the definitions are included below for
completeness. After this, the next section characterizes equilibria in terms of the zeros
of a quartic polynomial. The following section analyzes properties of equilibrium.
Definition 4.0.1. Given initial conditions (®x, s˜, d) ∈ RN×R×R for (X10 , · · · , XN0 ), S˜0,
and D0, we say that the profile of progressively measurable demand schedules
{(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )} and liquidity trader selling rates {Nt} is admissible
starting from (®x, s˜, d) if:
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1. βnt > 0 ∀t ≥ 0, ∀n = 1, · · · , N almost surely
2.
∫ T
0 |qnt |dt < ∞ ∀T ≥ 0, ∀n = 1, · · · , N almost surely
3. The double integral (1) converges absolutely
4. αnt , βnt ∈ σ
(
{Ds}0≤s≤t, {ps}0≤s<t, {Xns }0≤s≤t, S0
)
∀t ≥ 0, ∀n = 1, · · · N
5.
∫ T
0 |Nt |dt < ∞ ∀T ≥ 0 almost surely
6. The double integral (2) converges absolutely
7. Nt ∈ σ
(
{Ds}0≤s≤t, {ps}0≤s<t, {Ss}0≤s≤t, {S˜s}0≤s≤t
)
∀t ≥ 0.
Given a profile {(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )}, {Nt} that’s admissible starting from
(®x, s˜, d), denote by Jn (®x, s˜, d, {(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )}, {Nt}) the value of the dou-
ble integral (1) and by JLT
(®x, s˜, d, {(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )}, {Nt}) the value of the
double integral (2). These are the payoffs the market makers and liquidity traders
receive when everyone’s strategies are {(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )}, {Nt} and the
initial conditions are (X10 , · · · , XN0 ) = ®x, S˜0 = s˜, and D0 = d.
Definition 4.0.2. Given initial conditions (®x, s˜, d), we say that a profile {(α1t , β1t )}, · · · ,
{(αNt , βNt )}, {Nt} is a Nash Equilibrium starting from (®x, s˜, d) if:
1. The profile is admissible starting from (®x, s˜, d)
2. For any n = 1, · · · , N , and for any demand schedule process {(αt, βt)} such
that
{(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αn−1t , βn−1t )}, {(αt, βt)}, {(αn+1t , βn+1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )}
)
, {Nt}
is admissible starting from (®x, s˜, d), we have that
Jn
(®x, η, d, {(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )}, {Nt}) ≥
Jn
(®x, η, d, {(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αn−1t , βn−1t )}, {(αt, βt)}, {(αn+1t , βn+1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )}, {Nt}) .
3. For any liquidity trader selling process {N ′t } such that
{(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )}, {N ′t } is admissible starting from (®x, s˜, d), we have
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that
JLT
(®x, s˜, d, {(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )}, {Nt}) ≥
JLT
(®x, s˜, d, {(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )}, {N ′t }) .
Definition 4.0.3. A profile {(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )}, {Nt} is said to be linear
symmetric if ∃ a, b, c, λ, φ,M ∈ R s.t.
αnt = aX
n
t + bDt + cSt (4.7)
βnt = λ (4.8)
Nt = −φSt + MS˜t (4.9)
∀t ≥ 0, ∀n = 1, · · · , N .
Definition 4.0.4. We say that a, b, c, λ, φ,M ∈ R are a linear symmetric Nash
equilibrium if the profile defined by (7), (8), and (9) is a Nash equilibrium starting
from any set of initial conditions.
4.1 Equilibrium Characterization
Theorem 4.1.1. Fix exogenous parameters N ≥ 3 and ρ, γ, θ, σD, ψ, σS˜ > 0.
There is a one to one correspondence between linear symmetric Nash equilibria and
κ > − ρ2 + 12
√
ρ2 + ρ(ρ + ψ)(N − 2) that satisfy the quartic equation (29).
In equilibrium the trading price is
pt = Dt − ΓSt − ΛNt, (4.10)
the LTs selling rate is
Nt = −φ(St − piS˜t) (4.11)
and the MMs trading rates are
qnt = −κ(Xnt −
St
N
) + Nt
N
. (4.12)
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The endogenous parameters Γ,Λ, φ and pi are given in terms of κ by
φ =
2κ2
(N − 2)(ρ + ψ) +
2ρκ
(N − 2)(ρ + ψ) − ρ (4.13)
pi =
θσ2D
2Λ(ρ + ψ + φ)φ (4.14)
Λ =
γσ2D
N
N − 1
2κ2 + ρκ
(4.15)
Γ =
(
ρ + ψ + φ − κ
N − 2
) N − 2
N − 1Λ. (4.16)
Proof. For the first half of the proof we need to show that any linear symmetric Nash
equilibrium satisfies all the properties in the statement of the theorem. To this end,
fix parameters a, b, c, λ, φ,M ∈ R and suppose that they provide a linear symmetric
Nash equilibrium. Thus for any initial conditions the strategy profile given by (7)-(9)
satisfies the admissibility and optimality conditions in Definition 1 and Definition 2.
The optimality condition for the LTs strategy implies that for any initial conditions
−φSt + MS˜t ∈ argmax
{Nt }
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
Nt(pt − Dt) −
θσ2D
2
(St − S˜t)2
)
dt
]
, (4.17)
where
pt = bDt − ΓSt − ΛNt (4.18)
with Γ := −( aN + c) and Λ := λN . The relevant dynamics are given by (4), (5), and (6)
and the optimization is constrained to those {Nt} for which the profile with (7) and
(8) satisfies the conditions in Definition 1.
Denote by V(d, s, s˜) the value function for the optimization (17), i.e. the value of the
supremum when the initial conditions are D0 = d, S0 = s, S˜0 = s˜. The Hamiltonian
for the optimization is
H(d, s, s˜, η, y, z) := ηys−ψ s˜ys˜+
σ2
S˜
2
zs˜s˜+
σ2D
2
zdd+
((b−1)d−Γs−Λη)η− θσ2D
2
(s− s˜)2.
(4.19)
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As in Chapter 2 we have that the value function and Hamiltonian are smooth, and so
the following hold:
−φs + Ms˜ ∈ argmax
η
H(d, s, s˜,∇V,∇2V) (4.20)
ρV = sup
η
H(d, s, s˜,∇V,∇2V). (4.21)
Antidifferentiating the first order condition for (20) implies that ∃ a smooth function
w : R2 → R such that
V(d, s, s˜) =
(
Γ
2
− Λφ
)
s2 + 2ΛMss˜ − (b − 1)sd + w(d, s˜). (4.22)
As in Chapter 2, combining this with equations (20) and (21), and equating like
terms, we obtain the following equilibrium consistency conditions for the parameters:
b = 1 (4.23)
ρ(Γ − 2Λφ) = −θσ2D + 2Λφ2 (4.24)
(ρ + ψ)M = θσ
2
D
2Λ
− φM . (4.25)
An immediate consequence of equation (25) is that M , 0 because θσ2D > 0. Next
we show, by contradiction, that (24) implies φ , 0. If φ = 0, then by (24) we have
Γ = − θσ2Dρ < 0. On the other hand, if φ = 0 then Nt = MS˜t . Since M , 0, it follows
that {Nt} is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with mean reversion parameter ψ > 0,
exactly as in Chapter 2. Thus repeating the argument from the Theorem 1 in Chapter
2, the optimality conditions for the MMs imply that Γ = −( aN + c) = 1ρ
γσ2D
N > 0,
which is a contradiction. Hence becasue of (24) it must be that φ , 0.
We can now define pi := Mφ , 0. Then the LTs selling rate is as in (11) and equation
(25) implies that (14) holds. Also, admissibility of the MMs strategies impies λ > 0,
so we can define κ := − aλ . Then the MMs trading rates are as in (12). Next we
will derive the quartic equation for κ and show that the relations (13), (15) and (16)
hold. This will be done by looking at the optimality conditions satisfied by the MMs
strategies.
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As we saw in Corollary 1.2 of Chapter 3, the presence of the non-zero parameter pi
in the LTs selling rate (11) has no effect on the market makers’ optimal strategies.
Hence, the argument from Theorem 1.1 in Chapter 3 carries through verbatim2, and
we obtain the following equilibrium consistency conditions for the parameters:
− ρ
2
κ
N − 1 =
κ2
N − 1 −
γσ2D
2N
1
Λ
(4.26)
−(ρ + ψ + φ)N − 2
N − 1Λ = −Γ −
κΛ
N − 1 (4.27)
ρ
(N − 2
N − 1φΛ − Γ +
κΛ
N − 1
)
= − 2κ
2Λ
N − 1 −
N − 2
N − 1φ
2Λ + φ
( κΛ
N − 1 + Γ
)
. (4.28)
These are simply the equations (8) - (10) derived in the proof of Theorem 1.1 in
Chapter 3, but they are written in terms of κ, Γ and Λ instead of a, c and λ.
Rearranging (26) and (27) gives (15) and (16). Using (27) to substitute for Γ in (28)
and rearranging gives (13). Finally, inserting (13), (15), and (16) into the remaining
equilibrium relation (24) gives the following quartic equation for κ:
8
(N − 2)2(ρ + ψ)2 κ
4 +
16ρ
(N − 2)2(ρ + ψ)2 κ
3
+
(
8ρ2
(N − 2)2(ρ + ψ)2 −
2ρ(3N − 4)
(N − 1)(N − 2)(ρ + ψ) −
Nθ
γ
2
N − 1
)
κ2 (4.29)
+
(
ρ
N − 1 −
2ρ2(3N − 4)
(N − 1)(N − 2)(ρ + ψ) −
Nθ
γ
ρ
N − 1
)
κ − N − 2
N − 1 ρψ = 0.
To finish the first half of the proof, it remains to be shown that κ satisfies the inequality
constraint in the statement of the theorem. It will be shown momentarily below
that the admissibility conditions satisfied by the LTs and MMs strategies imply
φ, κ > − ρ2 . The inequality for φ combined with the relation (13) implies that either
κ > − ρ2 + 12
√
ρ2 + ρ(ρ + ψ)(N − 2) or κ < − ρ2 − 12
√
ρ2 + ρ(ρ + ψ)(N − 2). Since
κ > − ρ2 , the first inequality must hold, as in the statement of theorem.
Next we show that the admissibility conditions imply φ, κ > − ρ2 . First note that the
bound on φ implies the bound on κ. Indeed, the bound on φ implies that e−ρtS2t is
2In Chapter 3 we assumed φ > 0, which we have not yet shown. However, this assumption was
not used when deriving equilibrium consistency relations between the parameters from the MMs
optimality conditions, and that is the part of the argument used here.
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integrable for any initial conditions, and admissibility of the MMs strategies implies
that the double integral (1) converges absolutely. We can now apply the argument3
from Lemma 1.5 in Chapter 2 to conclude that e−ρt(Xnt )2 is integrable for any initial
conditions, and thus κ > − ρ2 . Hence we need only prove the bound on φ.
Now, the admissibility conditions for the LTs strategy imply that the double integral
in (2) converges absolutely. The integrand is of the form e−ρtQ(St, S˜t) for a quadratic
polynomial Q. The coefficient of S2t in Q is Γφ − Λφ2 − θσ
2
D
2 . We will need to deal
separately with the cases where this coefficient is and isn’t zero. If the coefficient is
non-zero, then we can apply the argument from Lemma 1.5 in Chapter 2 to conclude
that e−ρtS2t is integrable for any initial conditions, and thus φ > − ρ2 .
In the case where the coefficient is 0 we have that
φ(Γ − Λφ) = θσ
2
D
2
> 0. (4.30)
We consider two sub-cases, φ ≥ 0 and φ < 0. Obviously in the first sub-case we have
φ > − ρ2 , so we only need to deal with the second sub-case. In the second sub-case
we must have by (30) that Γ −Λφ < 0. The MMs admissibility conditions imply that
Λ > 0, and the relation (16) implies that Γ − Λφ = 1N−1Λ
((N − 2)(ρ + ψ) − φ − κ) .
Thus it follows that κ > (N − 2)(ρ + ψ) − φ > 0, and so e−ρt(Xnt )2 is integrable for
any initial conditions.
Now, consider the double integral (1), which converges absolutely by the MMs
admissibility conditions. The integrand is of the form e−ρtQ(St, S˜t, Xnt ) for a quadratic
polynomial Q with an S2t coefficient of 1N (κ − φ)(Γ − Λφ). This coefficient must be
non-zero because κ > 0, φ < 0 and Γ−Λφ > 0. Since we just showed that e−ρt(Xnt )2
is integrable for any initial conditions, it follows by the argument from Lemma 1.5 in
Chapter 2 that e−ρtS2t is integrable for any initial conditions, and so φ > − ρ2 .
We now turn to the second half of the proof, which requires us to show that if
κ > − ρ2 + 12
√
ρ2 + ρ(ρ + ψ)(N − 2) satisfies (29) then there is a linear symmetric
3See the last paragraph of the proof of Lemma 1.5 in Chapter 2. The same argument is used here
and twice more below.
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Nash equilibrium of the form given in the theorem. To this end, take κ as such
and define Γ,Λ, φ and pi by (13) - (16), Also define b = 1, λ = NΛ, a = −NκΛ,
c = −Γ + κΛ and M = piφ. We need to show that a, b, c, λ, φ,M ∈ R are a linear
symmetric Nash equilibrium.
The bound on κ implies that λ > 0, κ > 0 and φ > − ρ2 , so the profile given by (7) -
(9) is admissible. The MMs optimality condition follows by repeating the proof of
Theorem 1.1 in Chapter 3. The LTs optimality condition also follow similarly. The
argument is outlined here for completeness.
We can find a second order polynomial w(d, s˜) satisfying the equation
ρw = −ψ s˜ws˜ +
σ2
S˜
2
ws˜s˜ +
σ2D
2
wdd + (ΛM2 −
θσ2D
2
)s˜2 (4.31)
on all of R2. Now define the function V using formula (22), so that by construction
(20) and (21) hold. The first order condition for (20) is sufficent because λ > 0. The
transversality condition for V is satisfied because ψ > 0, κ > 0 and φ > − ρ2 . Hence
(17) follows by the verification theorem. 
4.2 Equilibrium Analysis
Finding the zeros of (29) is straightforward using any standard numerical software.
As benchmark exogenous parameters we take N = 10, ρ = γ = θ = σ2D = ψ = 1.
Extensive numerical simulations, both near and far from these benchmarks, always
find a unique zero satisfying the constraint. This suggests that there always exists a
unique equilibrium.
There are five endogenous parameters that describe the equilibrium: pi, φ, κ, Γ and
Λ. The parameters κ, Γ, and Λ are familiar from Chapters 2 and 3; they describe
equilibrium between the market makers taking as given the behavior of the liquidity
traders. κ is the rate of convergence to efficiency between the market makers, Γ
captures a risk premium, and Λ is the price impact the liquidity traders face when
trading. These parameters behave almost identically to the ones in Chapter 2, so for
brevity we don’t repeat their analysis here.
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The endogenous parameters pi and φ are new in this model, and they describe the
trading behavior of the liquidity traders taking as given the pricing function (10)
generated by the market makers. These parameters do show up in the model in
Chapter 3, but they are exogenous there. Below we study the economic properties
of equilibrium between the liquidity traders and market makers by looking at
comparative statics of pi and φ.
Instead of varying each market makers risk aversion γ directly, we will instead vary
their aggregate risk aversion γ0 := γN . The benchmark value for γ0 is γ0 = 0.1.
Varying N while leaving γ0 fixed allows us to focus on the effects of competition
among the market makers without changing their aggregate risk bearing capacity.
Conversely for varying γ0 while leaving N fixed.
In the plots that follow, unless a parameter is being explicitly varied it’s set equal to
its benchmark value.
pi: The steady state allocation between the LTs and the MMs
Recall that the LTs have an inventory of S˜t − St . The first term comes from trading
with clients, and the second term come from selling on the exchange to the market
makers. The clients exogenously want to hold −S˜t shares of the zero net supply asset,
so they trade with the LTs, giving the LTs an inventory of S˜t . The LTs then turn to
the exchange to unload some of this inventory on to the market makers, specifically
St . Thus the LTs hold S˜t − St shares and the market makers in aggregate hold St
shares.
Together the LTs and MMs always have a net shareholding of S˜t , which is the
offsetting position to the exogenous clients. Trading between the LTs and the MMs
occurs in order to determine how they share the exposure of S˜t between themselves.
We should expect there to be a steady state, at which the LTs and MMs have reached
an allocation from which they find it optimal not to trade with each other. This is
indeed the case, and it’s the role of the endogenous parameter pi.
Consider the formula for the LTs selling rate in Theorem 1. We see that the LTs
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stop trading on the exchange (Nt = 0) when St = piS˜t . St is the number of shares
held by the MMs in aggregate, so they stop trading with the LTs when they hold a
fraction pi of the clients’ offsetting position. We refer to the allocation of piS˜t shares
to the MMs and (1 − pi)S˜t shares to the LTs as the steady state allocation.
Note that no strategy profile can perfectly implement the steady state allocation at all
times. This is because the steady state allocation to the market makers piS˜t evolves
as a diffusion in time, whereas the true allocation to the market makers St evolves
smoothly in time. Instead, in equilibrium allocations are continually hit with shocks,
coming from the clients’ orders, and trading always moves allocations closer to the
steady state. This is discussed in more detail in the next subsection.
What might one expect pi to be? At the very least we should expect pi ∈ [0, 1], so that
the LTs and MMs always have positions in the same direction, opposite to the clients.
The numerics certainly always give this. More specifically, we might expect pi to be
θ
θ+γ0
. To arrive at this, note that the aggregate risk tolerance of the LTs and the MMs
together is 1γ0 +
1
θ , and the proportion of this coming from the MMs is
1
γ0
1
γ0
+ 1θ
= θθ+γ0
.
Thus a steady state allocation of θθ+γ0 S˜t would be one that is proportional to risk
bearing capacity, which tends to be typical in equilibrium models. This is not quite
the case though, as the next plot shows.
This plot shows that when ψ = 0 it’s true that pi = θθ+γ0 , but in general we have
59
pi < θθ+γ0 , with pi decreasing as ψ increases. This means that in general the LTs
hold more in the steady state than is proportional to their risk bearing capacity. The
reason is that ψ govern the mean reversion in the clients position. Suppose ψ > 0
and S˜t > 0. Then going forward, in the absence of subsequent shocks, one should
expect S˜t to decrease towards 0. Thus the LTs are happy holding slightly more than
their risk bearing capacity, because they expect to shortly be able to reduce their
exposure by trading with clients, and this is better than trading on the exchange now
and suffering price impact.
Comparing the colored lines in the plot above also shows that pi increases as θ
increases. This is because the larger θ is, the more risk averse the LTs are, so they
hold less in the steady state, and thus the MMs hold more, meaning pi is larger.
The next plot below shows that as N increases pi increases, so the LTs steady state
allocation is going down. This is because as MM competition increases, price impact
decreases, and price impact is the reason that LTs choose to hold a larger than risk
bearing capacity allocation. The effect is more pronounced when ψ is large. This
is because the alternative to suffering price impact is waiting for client positions to
revert to 0, so changes in price impact are more relevant when the mean reversion is
stronger, i.e. changes in N matter more when ψ is large.
60
φ: The rate of reversion to the steady state
The parameter φ governs the rate at which equilibrium allocations revert to steady
state allocation. The numerics always yield φ > 0, so from (10) it follows that the
liquidity traders sell on the exchange, Nt > 0, when they hold more than the steady
state allocation, St < piS˜t , and vice versa. Thus the steady state is attractive, as one
would expect, and φ governs the the strength of this attraction. The larger φ is, the
more aggressively the liquidity traders sell on the exchange when they are above the
steady state allocation.
As mentioned before, the steady state cannot be implemented by any strategy profile,
which is why we refer to φ as a reversion rate as opposed to a convergence rate. One
way to think about this is in terms of the equilibrium dynamics of the distance of the
system from the steady state. Define Et := piS˜t − St , which is the inventory in excess
to the steady state held by the liquidity traders. When Et > 0, the liquidity traders
would need to sell Et to the market makers in order to reach the steady state, and
when Et < 0 they would need to buy Et .
Using equations (4) and (11) we can solve for the equilibrium dynamics of {Et}.
Assuming the system starts at the steady state, i.e. E0 = 0, we have that
Et =
∫ t
0
e−φ(t−u)dS˜u. (4.32)
dS˜u should be thought of as the random quantity sold by the clients to the liquidity
traders at time u. Hence (32) gives Et as a weighted average of the history of
clients’ random orders. The random arrival of client orders is what keeps moving
the system away from the steady state, and trading between the liquidity traders and
market makers attempts to move it back. One can intuitively think of {Et} as an
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with mean reversion parameter φ. This is not quite true
because {S˜t} is not a Brownian motion but is itself an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
Nonetheless, φ governs the amount of mean reversion in {Et}.
So why don’t we have φ = ∞? The logic is analogous to the one given in Chapter 2
for why market maker allocations don’t converge to efficiency arbitrarily fast. The
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larger φ is, the faster the liquidity traders’ inventory reverts to the steady state, but
the larger the price impact the liquidity traders suffer. On the other hand, a fortuitous
realization of subsequent client orders could automatically move the liquidity traders
closer to the steady state. Thus the liquidity traders weight the chances of fortuitous
client orders against the costs of price impact in order to pin down a finite value of φ.
This is illustrated in the plot below.
This plot shows that as ψ increases, φ increases, with φ → ∞ as ψ → ∞. The
reason is that ψ governs the randomness in client orders. This can be seen from (6),
where the larger ψ is the the stronger the deterministic first term is, and the weaker
the stochastic second term is. Said another way, the stationary distribution of {S˜t}
has variance σS˜2ψ , which is decreasing in ψ. Thus the larger ψ is, the less likely are
fortuitous client orders, and so the liquidity traders trade faster, i.e. φ is larger. In
the limit when ψ →∞, there is no randomness in client orders, and so there is no
reason not to trade arbitrarily fast, i.e. φ→∞.
The plot also shows that φ increases as N increases. This is because price impact is
decreasing in N , and so the downside to trading fast is reduced as N is increased.
Looking at the next plot below, we note that φ 6→ ∞ as N → ∞. This is because
in the competitive limit price impact does not vanish, and there is still randomness
in the clients’ orders. In fact, the reason price impact does not vanish is precisely
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because there is still randomness in client orders. Price impact is the mechanism
through which trading prices reflect realizations of clients’ order shocks. Thus even
in the competitive limit the liquidity traders make a decision between guaranteed
trades for price impact with the market makers, or random trades for free with clients.
This trade-off pins down a finite value for φ.
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C h a p t e r 5
CONSUMPTION BASED MODEL
This chapter recasts the model from Chapter 2 into a consumption based setting with
a dividend paying asset. This is the standard setting for most asset pricing models in
the literature. The point of this chapter is to show that working in a consumption
based setting does not significantly alter the results presented earlier in the thesis.
As we will see below, the consumption based model is not as analytically tractable,
which is why it wasn’t used in previous chapters.
The first section lays out the model along the lines of Chapter 2, but with appropriate
modifications to accommodate for dividends and consumption. The second section
characterizes equilibrium in terms of the zeros of a polynomial system. Some details
of the proof are in the appendix to this chapter. The last section analyzes the models
equilibrium, showing that the economic properties of the equilibrium in Chapter 2
continue to hold here.
5.1 The Model
Fix a filtered probability space (Ω, F , {Ft}, P) equipped with two independent
Brownian motions, {BDt } and {BNt }, and satisfying the usual conditions. We
consider a market on an infinite horizon where shares of a zero net supply risky asset
are traded for cash (the risk-free asset). Cash is in infinite elastic supply, earns an
interest rate1 of r > 0 and is the numeraire. The risky asset is a claim to the dividend
1Cash earns no interest in the model in Chapter 2, though it is straightforward to incorporate an
interest rate there. In the consumption based setting here it is necessary to include a positive interest
otherwise the model is ill-posed [CK93]. We will see below that r in this model plays the role of ρ in
Chapter 2’s model.
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stream2 {Dt} which evolves according to
dDt = µdt + σDdBDt , (5.1)
where µ ∈ R and σD > 0.
There are two types of traders in the model, N ∈ N market makers and a collection
of liquidity traders. Trading occurs through a demand schedule auction. At each
instant the market makers submit demand schedules (αnt , βnt ) and then their trading
rates qnt and the trading price pt are determined by
αnt − βnt qnt = pt ∀n = 1, · · · , N (5.2)
q1t + · · · + qNt = Nt . (5.3)
Here −Nt is the current trading rate of the liquidity traders, interpreted as a market
order (vertical line demand schedule) to sell Ntdt shares over the time interval
[t, t + dt].
As in Chapter 2, the liquidity traders’ market orders to sell are exogenously given by
an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
dNt = −ψNtdt + σNdBNt , (5.4)
where ψ, σN > 0. The liquidity traders’ time t inventory is denoted −St , which
evolves as a result of trading according to
dSt = Ntdt . (5.5)
The markets makers’ time t inventories are denoted by Xnt , and they evolve as a result
of trading according to
dXnt = q
n
t dt . (5.6)
The initial conditions for (6) are the market makers’ inventories at the start of the
model, X10 , · · · , XN0 . Since the asset is in zero net supply, this also determines
2The zero net supply asset should be though of as a futures contract that is perpetually rolled
over. The dividends should be thought of as payments to/from a margin account. It’s no issue to work
with a finite supply asset, thought of as a stock, which is the standard setting for consumption based
models. However, the motivation for the thesis is trading of standardized derivatives contracts on
exchanges, so we work in the zero net supply setting.
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the initial inventory of the liquidity traders, which is the initial condition for (5):
S0 = X10 + · · · XN0 . Of course we also have St = X1t + · · · XNt ∀t > 0, which follows
from (3), (5) and (6). Thus St is the supply faced by the market makers at time t.
In addition to demand schedules, market makers also choose at each instant a cash
consumption rate Cnt , which is their ultimate source of utility. Each market maker’s
maximization objective is
E
[
−
∫ ∞
0
e−ρte−γC
n
t dt
]
, (5.7)
where ρ, γ > 0. The amount of cash held by each market maker at time t is denoted
by Mnt , and it evolves according to
dMnt = rM
n
t dt + X
n
t Dt − ptqnt dt − Cnt dt . (5.8)
Here the first term comes from the interest rate on cash, the second term comes from
dividends on the risky asset, the third term comes from trading and the fourth term
comes from consumption.
This sets up the model as a stochastic differential game between the N market makers.
Below we formulate the equilibrium concept analogously to Chapter 2. At first
glance one might be surprised that the market makers’ objectives (7) depend only on
their choice of consumption streams, and not on any other state variables. However,
when formulating the equilibrium concept below we include a No-Ponzi condition,
as is typical in the literature [Bac17] [KOW18]. This condition ties the other state
variables into the choice of an optimal consumption stream.
Equilibrium Concept
Definition 5.1.1. Given initial conditions (®x, η, d) ∈ RN×R×R for (X10 , · · · , XN0 ), N0,
and D0, we say that the profile of progressively measurable demand schedules
{(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )} and consumption streams {C1t }, · · · , {CNt } is admissible
starting from (®x, η, d) if:
1. βnt > 0 ∀t ≥ 0, ∀n = 1, · · · , N almost surely
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2.
∫ T
0 |qnt |dt < ∞ ∀T ≥ 0, ∀n = 1, · · · , N almost surely
3. E
[
− ∫ ∞0 e−ρte−γCnt dt] > −∞ ∀n = 1, · · · , N
4. αnt , βnt ,Cnt ∈ σ
(
{Ds}0≤s≤t, {ps}0≤s<t, {Xns }0≤s≤t, {Mns }0≤s≤t, S0
)
∀t ≥ 0, ∀n =
1, · · · N
5. lim infT→∞ Et
[
e−r(T−t)MnT +
∫ ∞
T e
−r(u−t)XnuDudu
] ≥ 0 ∀t ≥ 0, ∀n = 1, · · · , N .
Nash equilibrium is defined as usual. The admissibility requirement is given by the
definition above. Optimality is required for both the choice of consumption streams
and the choice of demand schedules. As before we will only by concerned with
equilibria where the market makers submit demand schedules that have a linear and
symmetric structure. We don’t place any explicit restrictions on the nature of the
consumption streams in equilibrium.
Definition 5.1.2. Demand schedules {(α1t , β1t )}, · · · , {(αNt , βNt )} are said to be linear
symmetric if ∃ a, λ, b, c, ξ ∈ R s.t.
αnt = aX
n
t + bDt + cSt + ξ (5.9)
βnt = λ (5.10)
∀t ≥ 0, ∀n = 1, · · · , N .
Definition 5.1.3. We say that a, λ, b, c, ξ ∈ R are a linear symmetric Nash equilib-
rium if for any initial conditions there exist consumption streams that when used
with the linear symmetric demand schedules (9)-(10) give a Nash equilibrium.
In previous chapters we saw that focusing on linear symmetric equilibria allows us
to formulate the equilibrium conditions in terms of a single optimization problem
over a trading rate. An analogue of this continues to hold here, as stated in the next
proposition. The proof is omitted because it’s identical to the one in Chapter 2.
The presence of the consumption streams does not change anything; only the linear
symmetric structure of the demand schedules is of relevance.
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Proposition 5.1.4. a, λ, b, c, ξ ∈ R are a linear symmetric Nash equilibrium if and
only if λ > 0 and for any initial conditions ∃{Cˆt} such that
a
λ
(
Xt − StN
)
+
Nt
N
, {Cˆt} ∈ argmax
{qt },{Ct }
E
[
−
∫ ∞
0
e−ρte−γCtdt
]
,
where
pt =
( a
N − 1 + c
)
St + bDt + ξ − λN − 1Nt −
a
N − 1Xt +
λ
N − 1qt
the relevant dynamics are
dXt = qtdt
dDt = µdt + σDdBDt
dNt = −ψNtdt + σNdBNt
dSt = Ntdt
dMt = rMtdt + XtDtdt − ptqtdt − Ctdt
and the optimization is constrained to those processes {qt}, {Ct} such that
1.
∫ T
0 |qt |dt < ∞ ∀T ≥ 0 almost surely
2. E
[
− ∫ ∞0 e−ρte−γCtdt] > −∞
3. qt,Ct ∈ σ
(
{Du}0≤u≤t, {Xu}0≤u≤t, {Mu}0≤u≤t, {Su}0≤u≤t, {Nu}0≤u≤t
)
∀t ≥ 0
4. lim infT→∞ Et
[
e−r(T−t)MT +
∫ ∞
T e
−r(u−t)XuDudu
] ≥ 0 ∀t ≥ 0.
5.2 Equilibrium Characterization
Theorem 5.2.1. Fix exogenous parameters N ≥ 3, ρ, γ, r, σD, ψ, σN > 0 and µ ∈ R.
If κ,Λ > 0 and F1 ∈ R satisfy equations (33) - (35) in the appendix, then there is a
linear symmetric equilibrium with trading price
pt =
1
r
Dt +
µ
r2
− ΓSt − ΛNt (5.11)
and trading rates
qnt = −κ
(
Xnt −
St
N
)
+
Nt
N
. (5.12)
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A formula for the parameter Γ in terms of κ,Λ and F1 is given in equation (32) in the
appendix.
Proof. Consider the optimization problem in Proposition 1.4 associated to a linear
symmetric profile with parameters a, b, c, ξ and λ > 0. The is a standard Markovian
stochastic control problem on an infinite horizon with state space (m, d, s, η, x) ∈ R5
and control space (q, c) ∈ R2. The Hamiltonian for the problem is
H(m, d, s, η, x, y, z, q, c) = − e−γc + rmym − cym + xdym − qP(d, s, η, x, q)ym
+ qyx + µyd +
σ2D
2
zdd + ηys − ψηyη +
σ2N
2
zηη .
Here P : R5 → R is the the function specifying prices in terms of state and control
in Proposition 1.4, i.e.
P(d, s, η, x, q) =
( a
N − 1 + c
)
s + bd + ξ − λ
N − 1η −
a
N − 1 x +
λ
N − 1q.
Also denote by Q : R3 → R the function specifying the optimal trading rate in
feedback form in Proposition 1.4, i.e.
Q(s, η, x) = a
λ
(
x − s
N
)
+
η
N
.
By the verification theorem, to show that the optimality condition in Proposition
1.4 is satisfied, it suffices to find a smooth function V(m, d, s, η, x) and a measurable
function Cˆ(m, d, s, η, x) such that
ρV(m, d, s, η, x) = sup
q,c∈R
H(m, d, s, η, x,∇V,∇2V, q, c) (5.13)
Q(s, η, x), Cˆ(m, d, s, η, x) ∈ argmax
q,c∈R
H(m, d, s, η, x,∇V,∇2V, q, c) (5.14)
∀(m, d, s, η, x) ∈ R5. Furthermore, the transversality condition for V and the
admissibility conditions for the Markov controls given by Q and Cˆ must hold.
Now, to demonstrate that (13) and (14) hold, it suffices to find a function smooth
function w(d, s, η, x) such that
rw = µwd + ηws − ψηwη +
σ2D
2
(
wdd − rγ(wd)2
)
+
σN
2
(
wηη − rγ(wη)2
)
+ xd +
ρ
rγ
+
log r
γ
− 1
γ
+
λ
N − 1
(a
λ
(x − s
N
) + η
N
)2
(5.15)
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wx(d, s, η, x) = bd + ξ +
( N − 2
N(N − 1)a + c
)
s − N − 2
N(N − 1)λη +
a
N − 1 x (5.16)
∀(d, s, η, x) ∈ R4. Indeed then we can take
V(m, d, s, η, x) = −e−rγ
(
m+w(d,s,η,x)
)
Cˆ(m, d, s, η, x) = − log r
γ
+ rm + rw(d, s, η, x)
to satisfy (13) and (14). For (14) we use the first order conditions, which are sufficient
because γ > 0 and λ > 0.
Furthermore, if w is a second order polynomial and aλ < 0, then the admissibility
and transversality conditions hold. Also, antidifferentiating shows that to satisfy (16)
w must be of the form
w(d, s, η, x) = bxd+ξx+
( N − 2
N(N − 1)a+c
)
xs−
( N − 2
N(N − 1)λ
)
xη+
1
2
a
N − 1 x
2+h(d, s, η)
(5.17)
for some function h : R3 → R.
Combining the arguments in the last two paragraphs we have proven the following
statement. If a < 0, λ > 0, and b, c, ξ ∈ R are such that there exists a second order
polynomial h that satisfies (15) and (17), then a, b, c, ξ, λ are a linear symmetric
equilibrium.
In the appendix we show that if κ,Λ > 0 and F1 ∈ R satisfy equations (33)-(35), Γ is
defined as in (32), and
a = −NκΛ (5.18)
b =
1
r
(5.19)
c = κΛ − Γ (5.20)
ξ =
µ
r2
(5.21)
λ = NΛ (5.22)
then such a second order polynomial h can be found. Thus the parameters above give
a linear symmetric equilibrium, and the formulas in the theorem follow by computing
equilibrium prices and trading rates using (2), (3), (9) and (10).
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5.3 Equilibrium Analysis
The equilibrium equations are in the form of a system of multivariate polynomial
equations. There does not appear to be a way to reduce these equations down to a
single one-dimensional polynomial equation. In general, solving such systems is
not particularly tractable, but there are a variety of numerical methods that tend to
work. Here we use the Homotopy Continuation Method, implemented with the open
source software PHCpack [Ver14].
This method works by starting with a proxy polynomial system that is easy to solve,
forming a homotopy between the coefficients of the proxy system and the actual
system of interest, and then tracking the solutions over the course of the homotopy.
The software automatically chooses the proxy system, but one can also choose
one manually. A natural choice for a proxy polynomial system would be the one
derived in Chapter 2, which we were able to solve explicitly. Using this as the initial
proxy gives the same results as allowing the software to choose its own initial proxy.
However, the software works slightly faster when allowed to choose its own proxy,
so that was the methodology used.
As benchmark parameters we take r = .01, N = 10 and γ = ψ = σ2D = σ
2
N = 1.
Extensive numerical simulations, both near and far from these benchmarks, always
find a unique solution satisfying the constraint. This suggests that there always
exists an equilibrium of the form stated in the theorem. Close to the benchmarks the
software finds the solution very fast, and the results are very stable over repeated
runs with same parameters. When very far from these benchmarks the software can
be slow, taking sometimes a couple of minutes to solve a thousand systems. There is
also slight numerical instability when very far from the benchmarks. Roughy 1 in
every 100 runs of the software on the same parameters fails to find any solutions.
The remaining runs always give the same solution.
In the plots that follow, unless a parameter is being explicitly varied it’s set equal to
71
its benchmark value. Instead of varying each market maker’s risk aversion γ directly,
we will instead vary their aggregate risk aversion γ0 := γN . The benchmark value for
γ0 is γ0 = 0.1. Varying N while leaving γ0 fixed allows us to focus on the effects of
competition among the market makers without changing their aggregate risk bearing
capacity. Conversely for varying γ0 while leaving N fixed.
The first result is that price impact is increasing in the market makers’ risk aversion,
as can be seen in the first plot above. The second result is that price impact is
increasing in fundamental volatility, as can be seen in the second plot above.
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The next two results are more interesting and are shown in the two plots below.
The first plot shows that price impact is decreasing in ψ. Here ψ is thought of as
governing the uncertainty in the liquidity traders’ orders. When ψ is large there is
very little uncertainty, and when ψ is small there is a lot of uncertainty. The second
plot shows that price impact is decreasing in market maker competition.3
The two plots above also show that the limiting behavior of price impact discussed
in Chapter 2 continues to hold. From the second plot we see that price impact does
not vanish in the competitive limit. The reason is that ψ , ∞, and thus there is
3In this plot we don’t use the benchmark value of γ0 but instead take γ0 = 1. This is purely for
visualization purposes. When γ0 = .1 and we vary ψ the lines all look flat due to the scale of the
y-axis. The pattern of decreasing to a non-zero limit holds regardless of what parameters are chosen.
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uncertainty in the liquidity traders’ orders. In the first plot we see that price impact
vanishes in the limit as ψ →∞.
We next turn to the rate of convergence to efficiency between the market makers.
Comparative statics and limiting behavior can be seen in the two plots below.
Three key properties that were seen in Chapter 2 continue to hold here. Firstly, the
rate of convergence goes to infinity as N or ψ go to infinity. Secondly, the rate of
convergence is concave as a function of N and as a function of ψ. In Chapter 2 the
concavity was specifically of the square root form. Finally, the rate of convergence
74
depends, for the most part, only on the parameters N , ψ and r. Indeed the plots
show the dependence on these parameters. We verified that there is essentially no
change in these plots when varying other parameters; the graphs all sit right on top
of each other and are indiscernible visually. The actual numerical values do depend
ever so slightly on other parameters. This is analogous to the formula for the rate of
convergence in Chapter 2, which only features N , ψ and r .
5.4 Appendix: Equilibrium Equations
We will show that a second order polynomial of the form h(d, s, η) = F1η2 + F2ηs +
F3s2 + F4 can satisfy equations (15) and (17) for certain values of a, b, c, ξ and λ.
Inserting this functional form for h into equations (15) and (17) yields an equality
between two second order polynomials in (d, s, η, x). Equating coefficients of the
polynomials gives the following system of nine equations.
rb = 1 (5.23)
rξ = µb (5.24)
r
( N − 2
N(N − 1)a + c
)
= rγσ2N
N − 2
N(N − 1)λF2 −
2
N(N − 1)
a2
λ
(5.25)
−r N − 2
N(N − 1)λ =
1
N − 1a + c + ψ
N − 2
N(N − 1)λ + 2rγσ
2
N
N − 2
N(N − 1)λF1 (5.26)
r
2
a
N − 1 = −
σ2D
2
rγb2 − σ
2
N
2
rγ
( N − 2
N(N − 1)
)2
λ2 +
1
N − 1
a2
λ
(5.27)
rF1 = F2 − 2ψF1 − 2rγσ2NF21 +
1
N2(N − 1)λ (5.28)
rF2 = 2F3 − ψF2 − 2rγσ2NF1F2 −
2
N2(N − 1)a (5.29)
rF3 = −
rγσ2N
2
F22 +
1
N2(N − 1)
a2
λ
(5.30)
rF4 =
ρ
rγ
+
log r
γ
− 1
γ
+ σ2NF1 (5.31)
Equations (23) and (24) are equivalent to (19) and (21). Equations (28), (30) and
(31) specify F2, F3 and F4 in terms of F1, a and λ. Next we change variables from
a, λ and c to κ, Λ and Γ using (18), (20) and (22). Then equation (25) gives Γ in
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terms of κ, Λ and F1 as
Γ =
2
r(N − 1) κ
2Λ+
1
N − 1 κΛ−γσ
2
N
N − 2
N − 1Λ
(
(r+2ψ)F1+2rγσ2NF21 −
1
N(N − 1)Λ
)
.
(5.32)
Finally, we are left with the following system for κ, Λ and F1.
−r
2
N
N − 1 κΛ +
σ2D
2
γ
r
+
σ2N
2
rγ
(N − 2
N − 1
)2
Λ2 − N
N − 1 κ
2Λ = 0 (5.33)
− 2
r(N − 1) κ
2Λ− 2
N − 1 κΛ+σ
2
Nγ
N − 2
N − 1F2Λ+2rσ
2
Nγ
N − 2
N − 1F1Λ+(r+ψ)γ
N − 2
N − 1Λ = 0
(5.34)
−γσ2NF22 +
2
rN(N − 1) κ
2Λ − (ψ + r)F2 − 2rγσ2NF1F2 +
2
N(N − 1)Λ = 0. (5.35)
In this system one needs to plug in F2 as
F2 = (r + 2ψ)F1 + 2rγσ2NF21 −
1
N(N − 1)Λ.
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DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This thesis leaves open numerous directions for future research. Firstly, the model in
Chapter 4 features clients whose flow the liquidity traders clear at the theoretical
value. This is inspired by the practice of traders buying flow from clients, though
typically this flow is not cleared at a theoretical value, but at the prevailing mid-price
on the exchange. It should be straightforward to consider such an extension of the
model. Secondly, it would be interesting to explicitly model the buying of flow from
brokers/clients. It’s probably difficult to obtain an equilibrium model where traders
pay a positive price for broker flow, which is what occurs in reality.
More generally, there has been an interesting evolution in market microstructure
that could potentially be modeled using the techniques in this thesis. It used to
be the case that market makers traded on the exchange, and certain broker-traders
executed orders on the exchange on behalf of clients. This is roughly the setting
modeled in this thesis, with the liquidity traders playing the role of the broker-traders.
However, nowadays these broker-traders are just brokers, and they sell their clients’
flow directly to market makers. The bulk of trading on the exchange now takes place
between market makers, after they have netted the various flows they have purchased
from brokers. There are also some sophisticated clients, typically hedge funds, who
no longer use brokers and instead trade directly on the exchange with market makers.
This is arguably the result of specialization. The brokers have specialized in client
services, and the market makers have specialized in trading technology. This has
probably raised broker fees to the point where hedge funds prefer to also invest in
trading technology. It would be interesting to model this evolution by extending
the models in this thesis, perhaps by allowing agents to invest in trading and client
service technologies. One place to start looking for ideas to build a model such as
this could be [BFM15].
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